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truly able to control the CEOs’ power over their own pay. 
 Secondary quantitative data from 25 Nordic publicly traded manufacturing companies 
were gathered from NASDAQ OMC Nordic 40 database, the company financial statements, 
and annual reports for the period from 2011 to 2015 and analysed through descriptive 
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The empirical findings showed that performance-based pay had a positive impact on 
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and the ratio of independent directors on the board had an influenced the level of CEO 
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Yritysten toimitusjohtajat toimivat osakkeenomistajien edustajina ja heidän tulisi näin 
ollen palvella näiden parhaita etuja yhtiön johtamisessa. Yleisen ”edustusongelman” (engl. 
”agency problem”) mukaan toimitusjohtajat sekä johtajat yleisesti asettavat kuitenkin 
omat henkilökohtaiset etunsa yrityksen ja sen omistajien etujen edelle. Siksi yrityksille on 
ratkaisevan tärkeää toteuttaa sellaisia palkitsemisstrategioita, jotka linjaisivat 
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Empiiriset havainnot osoittivat, että tulosperusteisella palkalla oli positiivinen vaikutus 
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1 Introduction 
A company’s ability to carry out production –deriving from technical-, managerial- 
and innovative capabilities– essentially represents a company’s distinctive 
competitiveness (Bottazzi, Secchi & Tamagni 2008, 1). Campbell & Underdown 
(1991) describe that the interaction of two dominant sets of factors, external and 
internal, determines the success of any business organization. The external factors 
such as environmental conditions, consumer behaviour, changes in government 
policies etc., are outside the control of the company’s management. The internal 
factors on the other hand come from within the company and involve the 
management’s ability to develop and carry out business strategies fitting the 
environment. (2-3.) 
The goal of the firm, however, is often not compatible with the interests of the 
managers who, given the opportunity, will act in favour of their own personal 
interests, even at the shareholders’ expense (Shleifer & Vishny 1997, 740-742; 
Jerzemowska 2006, 9). The matter of productivity and the efficient allocation of 
company resources should ultimately be done in order to increase the value of the firm 
and therefore, the wealth of the company shareholders. The issue of company long-
term profitability and safeguarding shareholder wealth has become an increasingly 
more prominent topic in recent years as the excessive pay levels of CEOs of large 
corporations have been on the surface of public attention. (Conyon 2013, 60.) Among 
the most notable scandals is Enron, which was the seventh-largest company in the 
USA, where the performance of the firm was not aligned with the bountiful benefits 
the management received from operating their company ineffectually (Core, 
Holthausen & Larcker 1997, 1). The topic of executive compensation has caught the 
attention of the media as well as legislators and has produced a considerable body of 
interdisciplinary academic research. (Murphy 1998, 1-2; Conyon 2013, 60). 
Additionally, the new Say-on-Pay passage under the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010 
aiming to increase the transparency of executive total compensation in public 
companies in the U.S has drawn more attention to the topic (Ludwig 2019). 
As the CEO is often held almost solely accountable for the success of the firm, being 
responsible for maintaining and executing corporate objectives and making decisions 
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that can potentially have definitive consequences on company’s success, it is only 
reasonable that the CEO is rewarded amply for their efforts (Core et al. 1997, 3). 
Whether the high pay levels of the CEOs are justified in terms of their contributions 
towards improving firm performance and serving shareholder interests, however, is 
debatable. This issue is the basis of the classical agency theory that is concerned with 
the relationship between the principal (owners/shareholders) and agent (manager) 
from which the agency problem derives. The agency problem questions whether the 
agents of the company are in fact committed to serving the shareholder interests and 
increasing the value of the company, or if their interest lies only in their own personal 
gain. (Bebchuk & Fried 2003, 1-2; Pepper 2018, 2-3.) 
One of the most important determinants of a successful organization is its 
compensation policy because it serves as a key factor in shaping how top executives 
behave. Creating such compensation arrangements that reward excellent performance 
and chastise poor performance is seen as a potential remedy to the agency problem 
(Jensen & Murphy 1990a, 3.) Canarella and Nourayi (2008, 295), and Mayers and 
Smith (2010, 298), also point out that controlling the incentive problems between 
managers and owners can be done by introducing incentive compensation provisions 
in the compensation packages that reward the CEOs for exceptional company 
performance. In determining the compensation packages the board of directors is 
ultimately in charge of how they are designed. It is, therefore, assumed that board 
composition would have an impact on the structure and level of CEO pay (Randøy & 
Nielsen 2002, 58).  
The current study examines the impact of CEO performance-based pay on firm-level 
financial performance. As many previous studies conducted on the topic focus on the 
total compensation, this research looks specifically at the effects of the performance-
based element of the compensation. This research draws its theoretical foundation 
from the agency- and managerial power theory. Agency theory states that 
compensation policies are designed to give management (and CEOs) proper incentives 
to make choices that increase the wealth of the shareholders (Jensen & Murphy 1990b, 
1-2). Managerial power theory argues that CEO pay is often excessive and that it does 
not correlate with performance and that CEOs often exercise power over the boards, 
being able to affect their own payment arrangements (Bebchuk & Fried 2004, 2). This 
study agrees with the agency theory and contends with the managerial power theory 
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by hypothesizing that performance-based compensation has a positive correlation with 
firm performance and that board composition affects CEO performance-pay.  
Based on the abovementioned research background the research problem is 
formulated as the Effectiveness of performance-based pay and corporate governance 
practices in enhancing firm performance and aligning CEO with shareholder 
interests. 
The study explores the following research questions: 
1. Is there any association between the firm-performance and the performance-
based compensation of CEOs? 
2. Do board characteristics impact the relative share of performance-based pay in 
the total compensation of CEOs?  
To answer these questions data of 25 Nordic publicly listed companies from the 
manufacturing industry has been collected for the period of 2011-2015. The impact of 
performance pay on firm financial performance is examined through several 
dependent variables divided into accounting-based-, market-based- and hybrid 
performance measures. In addition, the significance of corporate governance 
mechanisms on CEO pay arrangements is investigated with board structure, 
specifically size and share of independent board members. The required financial data 
for measuring company performance was collected from secondary sources including 
the company official annual reports and the stock market database NASDAQ OMX 
Nordic 40. The data for governance and compensation variables were also gathered 
from the firm annual reports. The data was analysed by calculating descriptive 
statistics, Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient as well as the Ordinary Least Square 
Regression model, through application of the statistical analysis software SPSS. 
1.1 Relevance of the Topic 
The topic of CEO compensation is widely researched by academics in various fields 
(economics, finance, accounting and management) with the majority being from either 
the U.S or U.K. (Mäkinen 2007, 11). This study aims to further contribute to the body 
of knowledge by focusing specifically on the Nordic region. Additionally, the 
performance-based element of CEO compensation is used instead of total 
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compensation in order to determine how well CEO pay is tied to company 
performance in the largest publicly listed manufacturing companies listed in the OMX 
Nordic 40 stock exchange.  
In this research the manufacturing industry in the Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, 
Norway and Denmark) is studied. The purpose is to draw light on whether or not the 
composition of remuneration packages of the CEO and other top executives correlates 
with the firm’s financial performance. In addition, the impact of corporate governance 
practices on the level of performance-based incentives is investigated in order to 
determine whether governance practices in the Nordics is effective in properly 
incentivizing CEO behaviour. This research will also give a new aspect with its focus 
on the manufacturing industry, enabling comparisons to be made with other regions 
and countries.  
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is divided into four sections: theoretical literature review 
and hypothesis development; research design and methods; results of the analysis; as 
well as conclusions, discussion and limitations along with recommendations for future 
research. Section 2 covers the literature review of the paper, familiarizing the reader 
with the theoretical background of the study, examining the topics of executive 
remuneration, corporate governance and related main theories, following with 
definitions of company financial performance and measurement along with 
justifications for the methods used. Based on the theoretical framework, the 
hypotheses were developed at the end of section 5. Following the review of literature, 
the methodology of the research is described in section 3, including used research 
methods, introduction of main variables and implemented data analysis techniques. 
Section 4 presents the results of the study along with analysis of their implications on 
the hypotheses. Finally, section 5 concludes the findings presented in the previous 
section and discusses how well they were able to answer the research questions and 
support the hypotheses. The limitations of the research along with recommendations 
for the future are considered at the end of the chapter. 
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2 Theoretical literature review  
The literature reviewed for this study explores the topic of executive remuneration in 
relation to firm financial performance and examines the role of corporate governance 
mechanisms with board structure on compensation arrangements. The two common 
and contending theories associated with discussions regarding executive pay are the 
Agency theory and Managerial Power Theory and will also be used here as the basis 
for examining the topic as well as the implications of research findings. The theories 
provide differing perspectives on the executive compensation, its level and 
arrangement, as well as its alignment with the shareholders’ interests. The theories 
also discuss whether a clear link exists between CEO pay and the financial 
performance of the firm. As determinants of the financial health of the companies in 
this study, several accounting – and market performance measures as well as a hybrid 
of both have been utilized.  
Many early studies have mainly focused on the aspect of firm size and profits relative 
to executive compensation. Later research has confirmed the positive association 
between them, showing evidence that the executive remuneration increases as the firm 
size grows, due to the need for higher level corporate and managerial skills increasing 
as the organization becomes more diverse and complex. In more recent studies, the 
focus has turned to the links between executive compensation and firm performance. 
Previous studies have grazed at the same issues in other industries such as the service 
sector, and of manufacturing in different areas and countries. (Carroll & Nourayi 
2008, 295.) It has also been found in previous studies that the corporate governance 
mechanism such as ownership structure and board characteristics can help to reduce 
the potential agent-principal problem, as they can be a relevant factor in how firms set 
up their compensation packages (Ozkan 2011, 261). 
Therefore, this paper will also look at corporate governance practices and study the 
effect of board structure, specifically board size and independence on the executive 
compensation.  
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2.1 Corporate Governance 
In this section of the paper the implications and effects of corporate governance 
practices on CEO compensation and further, firm performance are examined through 
existing literature.  
All corporate entities, both private and public companies, governmental corporate 
entities, as well as non-profit organizations must be governed. In its essence corporate 
governance deals with different ways power is exercised over these corporate entities. 
In companies this governing body is in the form of the board of directors and is 
involved with the activities of the board, its relationships with the members and the 
management, as well as with external regulators, auditors, and other stakeholders. It is 
good to distinguish that corporate governance is not the same as management. The 
responsibility of running the company falls on the executive management, but the 
board of directors is in charge of policymaking and formulating strategy while also 
supervising the company management. (Tricker 2015, 4.) 
When corporate governance is done well it can help prevent scandals, fraud as well as 
civil and criminal liabilities potential for the organization. Not to mention simply 
being good business by enhancing the company reputation making it more appealing 
to investors, customers, and suppliers. (Lipman, & Lipman 2006, 3.)  It is also 
suggested that greater agency problems and consequently lower performance is 
demonstrated by companies that have weaker governance structures in place (Core, 
Holthausen, & Larcker 1999, 372). 
Board of Directors 
The association between executive compensation and board structure has been studied 
in the past with mixed findings (Core et al. 1999, 372-373). The findings of past 
research will be examined in this section and based on the literature a hypothesis will 
be formulated at the end of the chapter. It has been found that the monitoring 
effectiveness of the board would reduce the CEO’s influence over their payment 
arrangements (Ataay 2018, 1156).  
The use of best practice-codes relating to board structure and characteristics are 
generally seen as crucial factors in controlling the power of CEOs and have therefore, 
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been the topic of various studies (see sections 2.2 and 2.3). The best practices 
addressed in the current study are related specifically to the structure of the board. The 
first board structure best practice is the board independence. Bebchuk, Grinstein, and 
Peyer (2009), state that in order to improve control particularly over executive 
compensation, director independence has been seen as a key instrument (26). 
According to Capezio, Shields, and O’Donnel (2011), studies have shown that non-
executive dominated boards would be more efficient at constraining CEO 
misbehaviour. The general understanding, supported by a considerable body of 
evidence, is that when CEOs and other top executives have more control over the 
boards the compensation is higher and performance sensitivity is weaker (Ataay 2018, 
1153). Presented by cases where the CEO was paid less than the market average, a 
negative response was less likely to happen when the board was controlled by 
‘owners’ instead of ‘managers’, therefore, indicating that greater board independence 
may lead to a necessary environment for incentive alignment (Capezio et al. 2011, 
490-491). 
On the other hand, a significant amount of research also argues against the best-
practice methods of board independence and outcome-based contracting. The findings 
suggest that executive insiders may in fact be more efficient in rewarding CEO 
performance due to their better understanding of the firm’s financial and operational 
management (ibid., 490-495). Therefore, it is not conclusive whether non-executive 
directors are truly more effective in controlling top management and wading off 
managerial entrenchment. The second board characteristic considered a best practice 
is the board size. According to Lipman and Lipman (2006), the general rule is that a 
board should not have more than 10 or less than 4 members. The reasoning being that 
a smaller board would be more effective in decision making since reaching consensus 
and avoiding disagreements is easier with fewer members. (14.) Bebchuk and Fried 
(2004), suggest similarly that more time and effort is needed from larger boards to 
provide adequate monitoring and supervision as they are more likely to be exposed to 
communication and coordination difficulties, consequently being less effective in 
constraining managerial behaviour (22). Alternatively, it can also be argued that larger 
boards are able to bring richer board resources to the table that can help improve 
planning and executing operations (Hundal 2017, 157).  
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In the light of the previous studies and their findings on the effects of board 
composition on executive compensation, the author sees appropriate to further 
examine their significance in the current study. The author hypothesizes that the use of 
best practice codes, in this case smaller more independent boards, would lead to 
higher outcome-based incentives received by the CEOs as compensation. 
2.2 Agency Theory 
A conflict of interest commonly arises when the goals or concerns between the two 
parties are not compatible. When shareholders want the CEOs to take certain actions 
in which the gained returns would exceed the costs, the CEO might not be so inclined 
if it does not serve his or her personal gain (Jensen &Murphy 1990b, 2). Such a 
situation commonly referred to as the agency problem or principal-agent problem, 
describes the conflicting interests between the principal (owner) and the agent 
(manager) in a relationship in which the agent is meant to act in the best interests of 
the owner. In the executive-shareholder relationship the agent (manager) is hired by 
the principal (owner) to run the company in their place. (Jerzemowska 2006, 8-9.)  
Agency theory is one of the most common theories linked to the executive 
compensation issue. Related to the agency theory view, the ‘optimal contracting’ 
approach acknowledges that managers suffer from an agency problem and are not 
inherently thinking of maximizing shareholder wealth. Under this approach creating 
proper incentives for managers is seen as an important factor in aligning manager and 
shareholder interests. In optimal contracting the company boards are viewed to be 
working in favour of the shareholders’ interests and are expected to devise 
compensation packages that efficiently incentivize managers to increase company and 
shareholder wealth. (Bebchuk & Fried 2003, 1.) In addition, according to the 
traditional agency theorists the use of best practices and independent boards are also a 
key factor in aligning the CEO’s interests with those of the shareholders with the use 
of outcome-based incentive plans (Capezio et al. 2011, 488). Conversely, some views 
question if the use of the combination of board independence and performance-based 
incentives are always the best method. Although a strong association between 
executive pay and firm performance is predicted by the agency theory in cases where 
the board utilizes outcome-based incentive plans, there is evidence suggesting that the 
association is almost non-existent between performance-based pay and firm 
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performance. Particularly in situations where a company is exposed to a lot of external 
‘market noise’ and volatility, the connection between CEO compensation and firm 
performance is evidently weaker due to CEO risk-bearing.  (Capezio et al. 2011, 488.)  
‘Market noise’ refers to activity or information that causes confusion or 
misrepresentation of true underlying trends, which can include for example market 
fluctuations misconstruing those overall trends. (Black 1986, 529-530; Kenton 2020.) 
Although agency theory is commonly used in justifying the link between CEO pay 
and firm performance, typically called “incentive alignment”, it does not predict a 
very strong relationship between the two.  The common consensus is that agents are in 
fact risk averse. Therefore, a potential problem exists that CEOs will go after 
strategies that are both low-risk and low-return if they are made entirely accountable 
for the company performance with their compensation. (Aguinis, Gomez-Mejia, 
Martin, & Joo 2017, 120.) In conclusion, there are two sides to the coin. On one side if 
the link between CEO pay and firm performance is too weak the agent may receive 
high compensation without sufficient results. On the other, the CEO may avoid high-
risk/high-return strategies if the link is too strong, also resulting in decreased value for 
shareholders.  
2.3 Managerial Power Theory 
The second theory commonly associated with CEO compensation is the Managerial 
Power theory. Bebchuk and Fried (2004), state that the managerial power approach 
argues against the agency theory view for executive compensation being a solution for 
the agency problem, and instead sees the pay-setting process as a core part of the 
problem. The executive compensation is also seen as being excessive and not 
correlating to company performance. (1.) Whereas the agency theory suggests that the 
right corporate governance mechanisms could work in safeguarding the shareholders’ 
interests in setting executive remuneration, the managerial power theory contends that 
top managers, especially CEO’s, obtain unreasonable power over the process of 
setting their own pay. (Bebchuk & Fried 2004, 8-9; Gümbel 2006, 221-223.)  The 
view of managerial power theorists is that CEOs may in fact be controlling the board 
instead of being controlled by it, devising compensation packages for themselves that 
secure generous rewards regardless of their actual performance or that of the 
company. (Kolb 2012, 32). Similarly, Ataay (2018), says that although boards are 
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responsible for setting the compensation arrangements, CEOs and other top executives 
might still utilize considerable bargaining power over the board, which would still 
lead to compensation packages that do not serve the shareholders best interests. In 
order to safeguard against the CEO’s managerial dominance and potential board 
capture, similar to agency theory, managerial power theory also emphasizes the 
importance of director independence. (1153.)  
Empirical evidence has shown that companies that had a higher proportion of 
independent directors, as well as an outside chairperson also paid greater levels of 
performance-based pay relative to total compensation (Beatty & Zajac 1994, 318-
319). Research of Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999, 403-404) has also further 
supported these findings. Still, although the managerial power theory advocates that 
more independent boards would be more proficient in aligning CEO incentives, the 
evidence remains equivocal with various studies (Conyon 2006, 39; Dalton & Daily 
1994, 59; Murphy 2002, 868-869), showing that there is no difference between CEO 
pay and performance whether the board consists of non-executive or executive 
directors and that it does not explain the differences in CEO pay levels and structures 
very well (Capezio et al. 2011, 488).   
2.4 Executive remuneration 
Excessive CEO and top executive compensation levels, especially in the U.S, is one of 
the largest contributors to rising inequality. This escalation of top executive 
remuneration has widened the pay gap between the bottom 90% earners and the top 
high earners, with a ratio of 278-to-1 when comparing the CEO to a typical worker. In 
2018 the average pay of a CEO from the top 350 firms in the U.S was approximately 
$17.2. (Mishel and Wolfe 2019.) According to another study the median CEO pay in 
the U.S in 2018 of 853 mid-sized companies was approx. $5.3 million, while 
European CEOs of 54 companies measured at $4.5 million (Ludwig 2019).  
Executive compensation has been the topic of numerous studies in various fields, with 
researchers attempting to unveil whether the pay levels of CEOs and top executive 
management is justified and if it adequately correlates with the financial performance 
of companies. Financial economists have viewed the compensation arrangements of 
managers as a partial remedy in alleviating the common agency problem and is the 
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leading approach in studying executive compensation. (Bebchuk & Fried 2003, 1-3.) 
Ozkan (2011), also states that the role of compensation packages in motivating top 
managers and, consequently, alleviating the conflict of interest between agent and 
principal, has widely been observed to be potentially a decisive one (261). 
In optimal contracting arrangements, according to Jensen and Murphy (1990b), high 
compensation levels might be involved when they are meant to provide strong 
incentives for managers to increase shareholder wealth. However, such generous 
compensation arrangements are problematic since they are solely connected with poor 
managerial performance. One mechanism for incentive alignment is the use of 
outcome- or performance-based compensation arrangements. By incorporating 
performance-based elements, the CEO is expected to be more inclined to make 
decisions that enhance company performance and increase shareholder wealth but also 
benefit the CEOs personally. (1-3.) Furthermore, an independent board is also 
considered as another mechanism in reinforcing incentive-alignment. A more 
independent board is believed to be better equipped to control the CEO compensation, 
since independent or outside directors are not directly tied or accountable to the 
company. Therefore, they are expected to be more likely to link the CEO pay more 
closely with the company performance and ultimately effectively safeguard the 
shareholders’ interests. (Capezio et al. 2011, 488.) Conversely, some argue that even 
though remuneration committees and boards of directors are predominantly 
independent nowadays, CEOs still have substantial influence (managerial power) over 
the boards and their own compensation arrangements (Murphy 2002, 848-850; 
Conyon 2013, 61).  
There are three prevalent reasons associated with the structure of the labour market for 
why the CEO pay has increased in the past couple decades including  
1. the reasons for the rise in CEO pay are the same as for growth in other 
occupations, and the labour market for CEOs happens to fit the model of 
perfect competition; 
2. CEOs have managerial power and can affect their own compensations, 
meaning their labour market does not fit the model of perfect competition; or 
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3. CEO labour market is similar to that of entertainment superstars, and the 
supply for qualified chief executives is rather inflexible, the demand, therefore, 
increasing CEO pay. (Mayer 2018, 9.) 
According to Lee (2002), the clearest area where the agency problem arises, is in 
executive remuneration, since the shareholders’ money is paid directly to their agents 
(70). The compensation packages of CEOs have been seen as an essential factor in 
alleviating the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers (Ozkan 2011, 
261). How much and in what form the top management should be compensated for 
contributions to the company’s profitability and performance is a challenging issue, 
not least due to difficulties in measuring the actual efforts of those in higher executive 
positions. It is recognized that executive positions require a great level of expertise 
and are considered highly demanding, which naturally should affect the level of 
compensation (Core et al. 1997, 3-4). The executive compensation packages often 
consist of two parts; fixed pay which is often in cash, and performance-based pay, 
which may consist of cash as well as non-cash components such as stock options. The 
company may also provide the CEO with different types of retirement funds and other 
long-term incentive plans. (Lee 2002, 70.) According to Murphy (1998) most 
compensation packages of executives include four main components: base salary, 
annual bonus (tied to accounting performance), stock options, and long-term incentive 
plans (3). Lee (2002), on the other hand suggests that executive pay has three aspects: 
salary, bonus, and long-term incentives which can include stock options or other 
equity-linked compensation. He further defines their functions as 
• salary for compensating executives for the yearly time and efforts, 
• bonuses providing incentive for reaching goals for bonus, and 
• equity-linked compensations for providing incentives for long-term 
performance. (70.) 
In this thesis, the main focus will be on the incentive-based element of CEO 
compensation. Performance-based pay will be examined on its own as well as in the 
form of two ratios to examine the proportion of performance pay relative to other 
elements of the compensation packages. The ratios are used to allow for a more 
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comprehensive analysis of the importance of the composition of the remuneration 
packages in relation to firm performance as well as board structure. 
Performance-based pay 
Although extensive empirical research on CEO pay-performance sensitivity exists, the 
angle of performance-pay has not been considered as comprehensively (El-Sayed & 
Elbardan 2016, 32), which is why this study examines this element of compensation 
more closely.  
When performance pay was first introduced many organisations had high hopes that it 
would help companies to deliver higher levels of individual and organisational 
performance as well as cultural change. Since then performance pay has become an 
integral part of organisations’ compensation strategies to inspire higher commitment 
and motivation. Performance-pay is built on the idea that reward can encourage the 
right kind of behaviour and that money is potentially an effective incentive to 
motivate employees to work in favour of their organisation. (Suff, Reilly, & Cox 
2007, 1.)  Suff et al. (2007), define performance-related pay as “rewarding employees 
with a financial payment, either consolidated or non-consolidated, following an 
assessment of their performance and, typically, the achievement of objectives” (1-2). 
Similarly, Baker, Jensen & Murphy (1988), describe pay-performance compensation 
as a practice where remuneration is tied systematically to a measurable output (7). 
Agency theory suggests that in situations where managerial decisions are not perfectly 
apparent to the owners, designing appropriate compensation policies would 
incentivize managers to take actions that increase shareholder wealth (Jensen & 
Murphy 1990b, 1-2). A common practice to align manager interests with those of the 
shareholders is devising highly contingent long-term incentive contracts in order to 
motivate top executives towards the kind of performance that benefits the company 
and shareholders’ interests in the long-term (Shleifer & Vishny 1997, 744). In this 
way the interests of CEOs would be more closely linked with company performance, 
and hopefully discouraging actions that promote only short-term development.  
As the core purpose of a business is always to aim for gaining and increasing profits, 
the bar for performance is being raised continuously. Regardless of whether the 
company is experiencing good growth or steady sailing, they should always reach for 
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more and beyond the horizon. This can have problematic effects when the top 
management’s pay is linked strongly to the company’s performance and targets are 
increasingly raised. This can counterintuitively provoke the executives to start 
‘working the numbers in their favour’. One reason for salary bonuses more and more 
taking the form of stock options, is the belief that when the compensation is tied more 
closely to the market performance, there will be less room for the CEO to manoeuvre 
the outcomes to their own benefit over that of the company’s.  
2.5 Financial performance 
The main purpose of an enterprise is to generate profit to ensure survival in the 
present and growth in the future (Nishanthini & Nimalathasan 2013, 1-2). A great deal 
of the theory in corporate finance, defended by acclaimed economist, finance scholars, 
and practitioners, is built on the supposition that a company should aim to maximize 
its shareholders’ wealth (Chandra 2007, 5-6).  
‘Profitability’ and ‘productivity’ are terms often encountered when discussing the 
efficiency of a firm’s operations. Profitability is evidence of the earnings potential of a 
company and on how effectively it is being managed (Chandra 2007, 2; Tulsian 2014, 
19.) When talking about profit and profitability, it should be noted that these are two 
separate terms. While profit represents the absolute measure of earning capacity, 
profitability is seen as a relative measure of earning capacity (Nishantini & 
Nimalthasan 2013, 1; Tulsian 2014, 19.) Company productivity on the other hand can 
be defined as “the efficient use of resources–labour, capital, land, materials, energy, 
information– in the production of various goods and services” (Prokopenko 1987, 3). 
Productivity and measurement of its growth serve as the basis for the analysis of 
economic growth. It is noted that particularly when international comparisons are 
made, careful attention is needed when choosing from the various existing approaches 
in measuring and interpreting productivity. (Measuring Productivity– Measurement of 
Aggregate and Industry-Level Productivity Growth 2001, 3.) 
According to Scarlett (2005), goal congruence is a state that performance measures 
should aim to achieve. This is where the best interests of management correspond to 
those of the company and making decisions in order to reach the company’s 
objectives are voluntary on the managers’ part. In order to effectively improve firm 
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performance, the used measure needs to be a fitting and applicable indicator, however, 
choosing the correct ones is not an easy task as performance measures are everything 
but fool proof. Adopting an unsuitable performance measure can result in undesirable 
consequences for example that managers might be inclined to take unsatisfactory 
actions either by focusing only on maximizing the measure while disregarding the 
company interests, or merely adjusting their own behaviour in such a way that desired 
results only appear to be reached. (127.) 
At the core of analysing financial performance, is investigating companies’ financial 
statements, which record all the firm’s business activities for a certain period. In 
financial statements companies’ performance reports can be found in a compact form. 
(Bosworth 2005, 41; Schönbohm 2013, 5.)  
Financial Ratio Analysis 
In order to extract information from a company’s financial statements, the data can be 
used in calculations to make interpretations about the health of a company, how well it 
has performed in the past, what its current financial position is, and predicting its 
potential future development. These calculations are commonly referred to as 
accounting ratios and are considered the basis of ratio analysis. The data for 
calculating the ratios can be found in the firm’s income statement, balance sheets, and 
cash flow statement. The purpose of accounting ratios is that they relate one financial 
figure to another while facilitating the process of making interpretations about a 
business activity’s performance. (Bosworth 2005, 41-42.)  
Using accounting ratios allows controlling for size and time as well as fostering inter- 
and intra-firm comparability (Broadbent & Cullen 1993, 47). Bosworth (2005) notes 
that in order for ratios to be useful in an analysis, the rationale for selection should be 
directed by the viewpoint (of management’s, owner’s, lenders’), the objective of the 
evaluation, and the standards of the comparison (42). Schöhnbohm (2013), defines the 
three most commonly used financial ratios by the company’s ability to: pay back 
short- and long- term liabilities, move inventory and collect receivables, and enhance 
profitability and investment opportunities. In this paper the focus will be on the third 
types of ratios that address the topic of profitability. 
Chandra (2007) classifies financial ratios into five categories:  
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• Liquidity ratios, 
• leverage ratios, 
• turnover ratios, 
• profitability ratios, and 
• valuation ratios (70).  
Leverage ratios examine the amount of debt used to finance operations and help to 
estimate the level of risk resulting from using debt as capital. One types of ratios 
analysing financial leverage are structural ratios which look at the proportion of debt 
and equity in the firm’s financial structure. (ibid., 72.) Two leverage ratios of Debt-to-
Equity (hereafter D/E) are used as control variables in the study. D/E measures the 
capital structure or financing aspect of companies. According to Chandra (2007), a 
lower debt-equity ratio generally indicates that the creditors of the company enjoy 
more protection. In other words, the higher the proportion of debt, the riskier the firm 
and its stock is to the shareholders (73.)  Moyer, McGuigan, and Rao (2014) note 
similarly that when the company’s proportion of equity decreases, investors may be 
more hesitant to acquire its debt obligations (82).  
The relationship between firm performance and executive compensation has shown to 
be highly sensitive to the type of measure used. Previous studies have used 
accounting-based measures such as return on assets and return on equity along with 
market-based measures such as total shareholder return and stock price, to determine 
company performance. As shortcomings for accounting measures, from the 
shareholders perspective, stock price changes affect their returns, and cannot be 
defined through accounting terms. On the other hand, market fluctuations and 
economic situations constantly affect stock prices and therefore, do not reflect 
executive performance wholly. Several studies have found that executive 
compensation responds more to market-based than to accounting-based measures. 
Conversely, other studies present strong connections between accounting-based 
measures and executive pay, which suggests that there is no clear consensus on 
whether compensation corresponds more to accounting or to market-based measures. 
(Canarella & Nourayi 2008, 295-296.) One study of Amarou and Bensaid (2017) 
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found that increase in firm performance also leads to higher executive total 
compensation, but that specifically the bonus element was dependent on the 
company’s accounting performance (68-69). 
Due to the reasoning above the financial performance of the sample companies in this 
study is measured by looking at both accounting and market performance, as well as a 
hybrid measure of the two using Tobin’s Q, in order to analyse the relationship 
between CEO pay and firm financial performance more comprehensively 
Limitations of Ratio Analysis 
The limitations often associated with analysing financial statements derive from the 
differing accounting policies between firms, which can make it difficult to produce 
consistent comparisons (Bosworth 2005, 41). Chandra (2007), adds that examining 
financial statements is usually not enough to draw sufficient conclusions about a 
firm’s performance, but they do give important hints about what should be 
investigated in more detail (69). Moyer et al. (2014), note that even though ratio 
analysis can produce valuable information, caution should still be exercised when 
evaluating the ratios can also be misleading. In order to critically analyse the ratios, 
one should recognize that 
• the ratios are only as trustworthy as the data that they are based on, 
• the validity of comparative analysis depends on proper definition of the 
industries and the availability of the data collected, and 
• financial ratios only give a historic record of the financial status and 
performance of a company. (96.) 
In conclusion, ratios should be seen as useful tools for supporting efficient 
management decisions but should not be used as substitutes for critical business 
judgment. (ibid.) 
Accounting performance 
To examine the effects of executive performance pay on company financial 
performance, several accounting measures are used including Net and Operating 
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profit, Return on Assets (hereafter ROA), Return on Capital Employed (hereafter 
ROCE), Earnings Per Share (hereafter EPS) and Marginal Productivity. 
Operating profit is a measure that provides an understanding of the overall efficiency 
of an enterprise. Operating profit is calculated by subtracting all operating expenses –
such as salaries, rent, research, and development costs– from the gross profit. Because 
operating expenses include all selling, distribution and administration expenses but 
excludes taxes, it presents the company’s earnings clearly. (Nishantini & 
Nimalathasan 2011, 3.) Net profit, also known as net income or net earnings, is 
obtained when all operating expenses, and other charges including interest, taxes, and 
depreciation are subtracted from the total revenue. Net profit shows the bottom line of 
what a company has earned or lost during the accounting period. (Murphy, 2020.) 
In order to evaluate the performance of a company one of the very basic and direct 
measures is its earnings. When buying and selling the stock shares of a company it is 
elementary to have an understanding of the value of those stocks. Calculating earnings 
per share is a direct way to find out the amount each single stock depicts of the 
company earnings, meaning how valuable one share is. Earnings show very explicitly 
that the larger the earnings are, the better the performance of the company is. (Cuadra 
2002, 39.) 
Profitability ratios include profit margin ratios and rate of return ratios. Profit margin 
ratios such as operating profit rate present the relationship between profit and sales 
and measure the management’s efficiency to generate profits on sales, total assets, and 
shareholders’ investment (Moyer et al. 2014, 84).  
Operating profit rate or operating profit margin represents the percentage of profit a 
company produces from its operations, before the subtraction of interest and tax. Also 
considered a profitability ratio, operating profit rate shows the ratio between operating 
profit and net sales. The main function is determining the operational efficiency of the 
company and its management by its ability to generate profits from its core business 
activities. Therefore, the higher the ratio the better the operational efficiency can be 
considered. (Tulsian, 2014, 20.)  
ROA and ROCE are both, according to Chandra (2007), rate of return ratios which is 
a type of profitability ratio showing the relationship between profit and investment 
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(77). Assets are resources controlled by the company, for example equipment or other 
property of value, from which the company is expected to produce benefits in the 
future. Capital on the other hand is the money that has been invested in the firm by its 
owners for the running of the business. In order to acquire assets such as buildings or 
machinery, the company needs capital to procure them. (Mackay 2018.) Capital 
employed equals the total capital the company has utilized which includes 
shareholders’ equity as well as debt and liabilities (Kenton 2020). 
ROA provides an indication on how much a business is able to generate income for 
each dollar (euro) of assets (Gallagher & Andrew, 2007, 92), which provides investors 
with an impression on how effectively the company converts the money it invests into 
earnings (Hargrave, 2020). ROCE shows how much return is generated for each unit 
(euro) that is invested in the business (Nishantini & Nimalthasan 2013, 5). When 
seeking to determine the overall performance of a company, ROCE serves as a useful 
profitability measure as it shows how well the owners’ and creditors’ investments 
have been employed into the business by the management. The benefits of using 
ROCE include that trends can be found to determine whether the company is 
improving as the measure can be compared for a span of several years. (Manna, Nath, 
& Gupta 2019, 57.)   
Marginal productivity – Productivity is in basic terms explained through inputs and 
outputs, how much output is produced with a certain amount of inputs (Rogers 1998, 
5-6; Diewert & Nakamura, 2005, 1). Marginal productivity or marginal product is the 
term used for that extra output gained for adding one additional unit of input to a 
process, while all other inputs remain unchanged (Machlup 1936). For example, when 
adding one extra worker (labour unit) to the assembly line of a product, marginal 
productivity is the extra products (output) assembled by adding that employee at the 
station, assuming that other inputs such as technology remain the same. According to 
the theory of Marginal Productivity a company will hire additional workers for an 
occupation “until the revenue from hiring another worker equals the market wage for 
the occupation” (Mayer 2018, 1). Therefore, if the pay level of a certain occupation 
decreases, the firm may hire new employees to increase productivity, and similarly if 
the pay rises, the firm may decrease the number of employees of that position to cut 
costs. However, Mayer (2018), argues that marginal productivity theory may not 
apply to the CEO pay because the fluctuations in CEO compensation levels do not 
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affect the number of CEO’s hired or reduced, as a company usually only has one CEO 
(1). 
Market performance 
In order to determine the relationship between the market performance of the 
company and CEO performance-based compensation several market performance 
measures have been employed, which will be explained in this chapter.  
When referring to ‘the market’ or ‘stock market’ investors usually talk about stocks as 
a group, meaning an organized market for stocks which are primarily in the form of 
shares, bonds, and derivatives (Imperiale 2005, 1; Dembinski 2003, 128). 
Market Capitalization–Cuadra (2002), defines market capitalisation, or market cap, of 
a stock as the total value given to a stock by the market participants (35). It shows a 
public company’s whole tradable value and serves as an indicator of the firm’s future 
value or net worth in the public opinion. Also known as market value, market cap can 
be used as a measure of share market performance, as an economic indicator for 
comparing size and growth of business activities, and also as a key measure in stock 
valuation. (Selvam, Gayathri, Vasanth, & Marxiaoli 2016, 94; iMinds 2009, 1.) 
Typically, companies are split into three caps (capitalizations); large-cap, mid-cap, 
and small-cap each with their own distinct characteristics. Companies falling in the 
large-cap category are usually big companies in leading industries and enjoy stability 
as they are not easily shaken by outside forces so that their stock prices would be 
significantly affected. Large-cap companies’ stocks are therefore, considered to be 
less risky but also yielding smaller returns. The stock of small-cap companies on the 
other hand are more mobile and likely to give significant returns on investment, with 
the downside of course, that being more volatile they also possess a larger amount of 
risk. Mid-cap companies fall somewhere in between and have decent growth potential 
while being less risky, which is why mid-cap companies have been popular among 
investors and traders. (Cuadra 2002, 36; Brooks, Holzhauer, & Lu 2014, 33.) The 
market capitalization values are usually divided as:  $10 billion of more=large-cap, $2 
to 10 billion= mid-cap, and $300 million to $2 billion= small-cap (Chen 2020). 
The benefits of using market cap as an economic measure include that its calculation 
is simple and the data for it is easily and widely accessible.  (Cuadra 2009, 1.) It is 
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calculated by multiplying the market price per share with the number of shares 
outstanding (Imperiale 2005, 2). Limitations of market cap include that it is not the 
most accurate of equity measures, for one because it does not include all components 
that determine the value of an enterprise, such as debt, cash, or other interests held by 
the company. There is also the matter of whether the firm’s stock is properly valued– 
or if it is under- or overvalued– in which case relying too heavily on market cap in 
determining firm value could result in inaccurate deductions about the company’s 
actual performance. (iMinds, 2009, 1.)  
Beta– Risk assessment is seen as a fundamental part of estimating the value of capital 
investments. Beta coefficient works as a measure of the systematic risk or volatility of 
an investment or asset in relation to the unsystematic risk of the stock market (Karačić 
& Bukvić 2014, 521). Maniatis (2011), continues that evaluating risk is a very 
important component when dealing with stocks because the stock’s profitability goes 
hand in hand with the negative movement of the value of the stock. Therefore, if 
investors are to expect high returns on their investments, they also need to consider 
the existence of a higher degree of risk. (25.) Beta is also relevant to investors since 
diversification can be used to eliminate unsystematic risk but not systematic, 
therefore, their rewards lie only in braving the domain of systematic risk (Hundal, 
Eskola, & Tuan 2019). Beta is used to calculate the expected return of an asset which 
indicates that high-risk (high beta) assets should yield a higher return than low-risk 
(low beta) assets (Perković 2011, 102).   
The relevance of determining the level of risk in the topic of executive remuneration, 
due to the need to compensate for example CEO’s risk-bearing in their decision-
making. It is only reasonable that especially in industries demonstrating high market 
volatility, that it is taken into consideration when devising executive compensation 
packages, to prevent possibly risk-averse behaviour.   
Hybrid performance –Tobin’s Q 
As many previous studies have provided evidence supporting that both accounting and 
market performance have an impact on the compensation (Canarella & Nourayi 2008, 
294-296), it was found essential to measure both for the analysis of the current study. 
Tobin’s Q according to Fu, Singhal & Parkash (2016) is assumed to represent a firm’s 
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investment and growth opportunities (1). Defined as the ratio of the sum of the market 
value of debt and equity to the replacement cost of the firm’s assets (Daines 2001, 9-
10; Hundal 2017). Replacement cost in this case would roughly mean, how much it 
would cost to re-establish the company today. Manna et al. (2019), add that Tobin’s Q 
has been widely used in financial literature to examine future investment opportunities 
and is a popular ratio in a variety of different situations examining financial 
phenomena and decision-making (57). Previous studies present varying uses for 
Tobin’s Q that range from explaining relationships between managerial ownership and 
firm value, market structure, and profitability to diversification and firm performance 
(Fu et al. 2016, 1). Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988), for example used it to 
measure firm performance in estimation of the relative importance of focus, industry, 
and share effects (246-248).  
2.6 Hypothesis development 
Once the literature review on the research topic is done, the following step is to 
develop hypotheses based on the theories studied. A hypothesis is the assumption on 
which the research premises are based on and which will be tested by the findings of 
the study. Hypothesis development is important as it works to authenticate the 
findings of the research through quantification and testing. (Bhattacharyya 2006, 11.) 
Sachdeva (2009), defines a hypothesis as “a specific statement of prediction” which 
explains specifically what is expected to happen in the study (11).   
Based on the literature review on the topic the following hypotheses were formulated: 
H1: Board characteristics influence performance-based pay 
 H1a: Board size affects the performance-based pay 
 H1b: A more independent board of directors gives more performance-
 based pay 
H2: Performance-based pay influences the company financial performance 
 H2a: Higher performance-based pay leads to a higher accounting 
 performance 
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 H2b: Higher performance-based pay leads to a higher market 
 performance 
The author hypothesizes that good firm performance and the proportion of 
performance-based compensation paid to executive management would have a strong 
positive relationship, meaning the higher the performance pay the higher the overall 
firm performance. Furthermore, board characteristics are hypothesized to impact the 
composition of executive remuneration packages in a way that more independent 
boards would pay higher levels of performance-based pay. Additionally, it is supposed 
that the size of the board would also impact the level of CEO performance pay.  
3 Methodology  
The objective of the current research is to provide further understanding of whether 
Nordic manufacturing companies’ executive compensation practices as well as board 
characteristics have an impact on their financial performance. The secondary data is 
collected from the annual reports of these 25 companies over a 5–year period in order 
to highlight the possible changes and provide a more comprehensive perspective of 
the topic. As mentioned in the literature review section of the paper, the topic of 
executive remuneration and firm performance is a widely researched area, however, it 
is more focused on the U.S with fewer studies from Europe or the Nordic region. 
Therefore, this study aims to gain further understanding of the issue and its 
implications in the Nordic countries.  
The term ‘method’ encompasses the techniques for collecting information or evidence 
as well as various means of progressing in that information gathering. ‘Methodology’ 
on the other hand means the underlying theory and analysis of how research advances 
or should advance and is often guided by discipline. To methodology also relates the 
theory of knowledge “epistemology” determining what can be observed. (Sachdeva 
2009, 7.)  
The research design is the plan of how the conceptual research problem is related to 
relevant and applicable empirical research (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2002). The research 
design should provide a strategic approach that will allow the best possible way to 
answer the research questions within the given frame. in other words, the research 
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design can be seen as the strategy on how to obtain the information that is needed to 
conduct the research. It defines the research actions, such as what type of data is to be 
collected and also how to collect it. (47.) Ghauri and Gronhaug (2002, 48), list three 
main classes of research designs: exploratory, descriptive, and causal. Saunders, 
Lewis, and Thornhill (2009) refer to these as research purposes and use the term 
‘explanatory’ for causal design which is perhaps the more common term (138-139). 
The choice of design is dependent on how structured the research problem is. The 
designs are matched as follows: 
Research design  Problem structure 
Exploratory  Unstructured 
Descriptive  Structured 
Causal  Structured 
Exploratory research is characterized by problem solving and flexibility. This design 
is suitable when the research problem more or less inadequately understood. The 
potential causes of a phenomenon are investigated in an experimental way. 
Descriptive and causal designs are used when the research problem is structured and 
properly understood. Whereas descriptive research aims to only systematically 
observe and describe a phenomenon, causal/ exploratory research also investigates the 
cause-and-effect factors of the research problem. (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2002, 49.)  In 
the case of this study, as it has been established in previous sections that the topic has 
been widely studied and a bulk of research exists, the research design was chosen to 
be causal– or explanatory– studying the cause-and-effect factors between the 
variables.  
Research philosophy is related to the development and nature of knowledge and holds 
crucial assumptions about the way in which the researcher views the surrounding 
world. The research strategy and methods chosen as a part of that strategy are based 
upon these assumptions. (Saunders et al. 2009, 108.) Based on the nature of the 
current research being highly structured and focused on the causality between 
variables as well as being relatively independent of social factors the choice research 
philosophy was positivist. The positivist philosophy is concerned with observable 
facts and the objective stance of the researcher. According to the positivist philosophy, 
   26 
 
the data collected, and hypotheses formulated have been done based on existing 
theories and the observable facts (company data) are used to test those hypotheses to 
produce credible and generalisable results.  (ibid., 113-114.)  
In building a research design it is also important to determine what research approach 
would be most suitable for a given study. There are two approaches: deductive and 
inductive. In the deductive approach a theory and hypothesis are developed after 
which the research strategy is designed in order to test that hypothesis. The inductive 
approach differs in order so that a theory is developed as a result of the data collection 
and analysis. Induction is concerned with building a theory –as opposed to testing an 
existing one– by collecting data and attempting to uncover the reasons behind a 
phenomenon. The deductive approach is more often connected to what one might call 
scientific research, seeking to explain causal relationships between variables, 
therefore, also associating it more closely with the positivist research philosophy. 
(ibid., 124-126.) Due to these reasons, the choice of approach in the current study was 
deductive.  
There are two primary types of research methods with their own distinct 
characteristics. Depending on the nature of the phenomenon researched, one can 
choose to use either a qualitative or a quantitative approach to conducting the study, 
but also a combination of both. Quantitative methods are described as more ‘result-
oriented’ and analytical in nature, as well as having an emphasis on testing and 
verification. Qualitative, on the other hand, is more process-oriented, subjective, and 
has an emphasis on understanding. (Ghauri and Gronhaug 2002, 86.)  Saunders et al. 
(2009) distinguish quantitative and qualitative analysis techniques as statistical and 
non-statistical (3). Research is usually classified as qualitative when a problem or 
phenomena needs to be understood or explored further and requires unstructured 
exploratory techniques to do so. Large samples of data are usually handled in 
quantitative research that are studied through some form of statistical analysis. 
(Bhattacharyya 2006, 390.)  
The method chosen for the current study was quantitative as the study examines a 
large sample of data to test existing theories. Furthermore, as an extensive body of 
prior research exists and due to time and resource limitations in conducting this study, 
the author chose not to use qualitative research in combination.  
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3.1 Data Collection 
Data From the 25 largest manufacturing companies in the Nordic region was collected 
for the purposes of this study. The source for data on share prices was collected from 
the Nasdaq OMX Nordic 40 index. In addition, accounting figures and corporate 
governance information were obtained from the annual reports of the sample firms, 
specifically from the financial statements and corporate governance reports. Both of 
these data sources are considered as secondary which is defined as data that has 
already been collected by someone else for some other purpose (Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill 2009, 256). The total sample for the research consisted of 25 publicly listed 
manufacturing companies. The data was collected from 1st January 2011 to 31st 
December 2015, with the exception of the data for calculating marginal productivity, 
for which data was collected starting from 1st January 2010. In total the collected data 
accounts for five years of observations.  
Data collection is a core element in research therefore, it is essential to understand the 
type of data relevant to a given research problem and the most credible sources and 
effective way of collecting. Data in research is usually divided into two types: primary 
and secondary data. (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2002, 76.) Primary data is collected by the 
researcher themselves using for example questionnaires, surveys, or interviews to fit 
that particular study and research problem). The advantage of using primary data is 
therefore, that it is more consistent with the research questions and objectives of the 
study at hand. Disadvantages include that the collection can be costly as well as take a 
long time to do. Also, the researcher needs to be more careful in selecting tools and 
analysis methods when using primary data to avoid jeopardizing the reliability of the 
research. (ibid., 81-82.) 
Secondary data is data that has already been collected and presented by someone else 
for some other purpose, but which can be used to answer our research questions. 
Secondary data can be divided into internal and external. Internal sources include 
information about suppliers, customers, employees, marketing plans, etc. This 
information is usually available when working for a company and cannot be taken at 
face value. The annual reports of companies are a part of published external sources. It 
is noted that such as the internal sources, the company annual statements also have a 
tendency to present information in a more beneficial light, so they should also be 
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reviewed with a critical eye. The benefits of secondary data are that there is an 
abundance available and it is often easily accessible through the internet. Using 
secondary data also relieves the researcher from having to create questionnaires or 
interviews to collect their own data, which might result in faulty results if not done 
properly. The disadvantages of secondary data include the fact that the data might 
have been collected for a completely different purpose and therefore, may not fit our 
research objectives as well as it should. One way to counter this issue is by using the 
research problem of the study as the starting point for the data that is needed, so if the 
data does not fit the problem, it should be discarded. (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2002, 78-
80.) 
The data has been collected from the annual statements of the 25 sample companies, 
specifically from the income statement, balance sheet, and corporate governance 
statement, and is characterized as secondary. To assess the companies’ performance, 
both accounting and market-based measures are used since both have been utilized in 
previous research. Accounting measures are used to analyse the firms’ internal 
performance and market measures to examine how the companies perform relative to 
the market.  The data collected to examine CEO remuneration include total 
compensation, fixed pay, and performance pay.  
The time horizon of a five-year period was chosen in order to answer the research 
questions of the study and fit the purpose of a quantitative analysis of the Nordic 
manufacturing companies’ financial data. In research methodology, the study would 
be referred to as longitudinal as the data is examined over an extended period from a 
‘diary’ perspective (Saunders et al. 2009, 155). The advantages of longitudinal studies 
include that they are able to answer questions about cause and consequence 
effectively, and the reliability of the results increases as the changes in the data are 
examined over a longer period (Adams, Khan, & Raeside 2014, 7-8). 
Sampling is needed in research because rarely is it possible or even optimal in terms 
of resources to attempt to gather data from an entire population. Sampling takes only a 
portion of the population and generalizes the results in an attempt to answer questions 
on behalf of that whole population. (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2002, 112.) The population, 
in this case, are manufacturing companies listed in the Nordic stock exchange. 
Sampling procedures can be divided into non-probability and probability sampling. 
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Ghauri & Gronhaug (2002) argue that non-probability sampling would not be 
representative and that valid inferences could not be made with it of the population. 
This is because non-probability sampling does not allow for assessment of the amount 
of sampling error, unlike probability sampling does. (113.)  
Regardless, non-probability sampling has been used in this study, more specifically 
the judgment sampling.  
The companies selected for the sample represent a number of the largest in the 
industry listed in the OMX Nordic 40 based on total share turnover.  The reasoning for 
using companies from only one industry (manufacturing) in the sample was keeping 
the measurement and analysis of the data as simple and comparable as possible. The 
author justifies the use of this sampling method because it was the most advantageous 
for the purposes of this study. In this method the sample units have been carefully 
selected in a way that the author believes will represent the population the best. 
Additionally, The reasoning for selecting the largest companies was that the data 
would be best available and most consistent in quality. The structure of the variables 
is presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 Variable classification (Adapted by the author) 
* Control variables included  
 
Dependent
Financial 
Performance
Accounting Market Hybrid
Independent*
Board
Performance-
pay
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The main dependent variables consist of the ratios measuring accounting, market, and 
hybrid performance of the company. Also, the performance pay variables were used as 
dependent when examining the effect of board characteristics on compensation. 
In order to reduce heteroscedasticity in the measurements, the natural logarithmic 
(LN) values have been used for several of the variables, including Net Profit, 
Operating Profit, BV (book value) of Assets, BV Equity, BV Debt, Performance Pay 
and Board Size.  
To assess the accounting performance of the companies ROA, ROCE, Net Profit, 
Operating Profit, Marginal Productivity, and EPS were used. Here ROA is calculated 
by dividing net income (EBIT) with total assets (or book value of assets).   ROCE is 
calculated by dividing net profit after interest and tax by capital invested. Capital 
employed is determined by the sum of net current assets and net tangible fixed assets. 
(Nishantini & Nimalthasan 2013, 5-6.) ROCE is calculated as follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡)
 
The market performance measures used in this research consist of Market 
Capitalization, Stock return, as well as Beta to measure market risk.  
Market Capitalization represents the market value as well as the size of the company 
and is calculated by dividing the yearly average of the market price per share by the 
total number of shares. The formula for stock return was calculated through the 
following formula: 
 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =  
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦−𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑑𝑎𝑦
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑑𝑎𝑦
 
Beta was also used as a measure of market performance in the form of market risk. As 
explained in section 2.4, the beta of a security is a measure of systematic risk 
benchmarked against the market and it determines the stock returns sensitivity to 
changes in systematic factors. A beta of less than 1 indicates that the stock is less 
volatile than the market. When the beta value exceeds 1, the firm’s stocks are exposed 
to a higher level of risk than the market. To calculate beta, the following formula has 
been used: 
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𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑅𝑒 , 𝑅𝑚
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑅𝑚)
 
Where: 
𝑅𝑒 – stock return 
𝑅𝑚 – market return 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 – a measure of a stock’s return relative to the market’s return 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 – a measure of the market moves relative to its mean 
Tobin’s Q has been used as a hybrid measure of both accounting- and market 
performance with the following formula: 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠𝑄 =  
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
The Tobin’s Q is low when the value is between 0 and 1 and it indicates that the stock 
is undervalued. Conversely, if the value is greater than 1 the Q is high and shows that 
the stock costs more than the replacement cost of the firm’s assets, implying that the 
stock is overvalued. (Hutabarat & Senjaya 2016, 466.) 
The main independent variables include Performance Pay (LN), Ratio of performance 
Pay 1 (performance pay-to-total compensation), and the Ratio of Performance Pay 2 
(performance pay-to-fixed pay) to measure CEO performance-based compensation. In 
the measure of performance pay (LN), the component of only cash bonus has been 
used from the CEO performance incentives, excluding for example stock options. The 
justification is that the cash bonus is seen as a more traditional and widely accepted 
form of compensation.  
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦 =
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦
 
In addition, corporate governance variables are used as independent variables to 
examine the effect of board characteristics on the performance pay element of 
compensation. The measures include Board Size (LN), and Ratio of Board 
Independence. Board size is measured by the total number of directors and the ratio of 
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board independence is calculated by dividing the number of independent/outside 
directors by the total size of the board.  
Control variables used in the study include BV of Assets, BV of Equity, Debt-Equity 
Ratios 1 (hereafter D/E1), and 2 (hereafter D/E2). The Debt-to-Equity ratios were 
calculated as follows: 
𝐷/𝐸 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
 
D/E1 examines the proportion of debt to book value of equity and D/E2 to market 
value of equity. D/E2 is calculated in addition because the book value of equity can be 
inadequate in showing its true value in the case of rising prices (Chandra 2007, 436). 
 
Table 1 Variable descriptions (adapted by the author) 
Variable Label Definition Found in 
Independent variables 
Performance-pay 
Performance 
Pay  
LNPerfPay 
Natural logarithm of CEO performance-
based compensation 
Annual 
Reports 
Performance 
Pay-to-Total 
Compensatio
n Ratio 
RatioPerfPay1 
CEO performance pay divided by CEO total 
compensation 
Annual 
Reports 
Performance 
Pay-to-Fixed 
Pay Ratio 
RatioPerfPay2 
CEO performance pay divided by CEO fixed 
compensation 
Annual 
Reports 
Corporate Governance 
Board Size BoardSize 
Natural logarithm of total number of 
directors 
Annual 
Reports 
Ratio of Board 
Independence 
RatioBoardInd 
The number of independent directors 
divided by the total number of directors 
Annual 
Reports 
Dependent variables 
Accounting Performance 
Net Profit LNNetProfit Net income for the period 
Annual 
Reports 
Operating 
Profit 
LNOperProf Earnings before income and tax 
Annual 
Reports 
Operating 
Profit rate 
OperProfRate 
Operating profit divided by total revenue 
for the period 
Annual 
Reports 
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Table 1 Variable descriptions (continued) 
Marginal 
productivity 
MargProd 
The subtraction of net revenue of the 
previous year from the current year’s net 
revenue divided by the subtraction of 
previous year’s total cost from the current 
year’s total cost 
Annual 
Reports 
Return on 
Assets 
ROA 
Profitability measure calculated by dividing 
net profit by book value of total assets 
Annual 
Reports 
Return on 
Capital 
Employed 
ROCE 
Net profit divided by the sum of book value 
of debt and book value of equity 
Annual 
Reports 
Earnings Per 
Share 
EPS 
 Net profit divided by the number of shares 
outstanding 
Annual 
Reports 
Market performance 
Market 
Capitalization 
LNMarketCap Natural logarithm of market capitalization  
Annual 
Reports & 
NASDAQ 
OMX Nordic 
40 
Stock Return StockRet 
The subtraction of closing price of previous 
day from the closing price of current day 
divided by the closing price of the previous 
day 
NASDAQ 
OMX Nordic 
40 
Beta Beta 
A measure of systematic risk. Calculated by 
dividing the product of covariance of the 
stock return and market return by the 
variance of the market return 
NASDAQ 
OMX Nordic 
40 
Hybrid Performance 
Tobin's Q 
Proxy 
TQ 
The sum of market capitalization and book 
value of debt divided by book value of 
assets 
Annual 
Reports & 
NASDAQ 
OMX Nordic 
40 
Control variables 
Book value of 
Equity 
LNBVEquity Natural logarithm of equity 
Annual 
Reports 
Book value of 
Assets 
LNBVAssets Natural logarithm of total assets 
Annual 
Reports 
Book value of 
Debt 
LNBVDebt Natural logarithm of total finance debt 
Annual 
Reports 
Debt-to-Book 
value of 
Equity Ratio 
DE1 
The firm's capital structure calculated by 
dividing book value of debt by the book 
value of equity 
Annual 
Reports 
Debt-to-
Market Value 
of Equity 
Ratio 
DE2 
The firm's capital structure calculated by 
dividing book value of debt with market 
value of equity (market capitalization) 
Annual 
Reports & 
NASDAQ 
OMX Nordic 
40 
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3.2 Data analysis 
The link between executive remuneration and firm performance is difficult to measure 
accurately, due to variabilities for example in firm size, industry, country, and market 
fluctuations. For this reason, measurement and analysis were done in a way that takes 
into account these disparities. 
In this study three types of analyses were used: Descriptive statistics to interpret and 
summarize the data; Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient to find relationships between 
variables; and OLS Regression analysis to examine dependencies between those 
variables. Analysis in this case refers to computing specific indices or measures and 
looking for existing patterns of relationship among data groups (Kothari 2004, 130). 
The descriptive statistics serve in managing all the numerical data and provide its 
main facts. The primary findings in Table 2 contain the minimum and maximum 
values, showing the extremes in the included variables; mean, also known as central 
tendency, presenting the average of each variable; and standard deviation, measuring 
the dispersion of the data, meaning how widespread individual variable values are. 
(Adams, Khan, & Raeside 2014, 171-174.) 
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient (r) indicates whether a significant linear relationship 
between two continuous variables exists as well as the strength and direction 
(increasing or decreasing) of that linear relationship (SPSS Tutorials: Pearson 
Correlation 2020). Correlation analysis is about finding and determining the degree of 
relationships between two or more variables. The coefficient takes a value between -1 
and 1, where an r value close to 1 signifies a strong positive linear relationship, and a 
value close to -1 indicates a strong negative one. The SPSS software also shows the 
level of significance between the variables. (Adams et al. 2014, 200.) A positive 
relationship indicates that the variables move in the same direction, meaning that as 
one variable increases or decreases, so does the other. Negative correlation between 
variables on the other hand illustrates that as one variable increases the other 
decreases or vice versa indicating that the variables move in opposite directions. A 
high and significant correlation between variables, therefore, shows the degree of their 
relationship, however, it does not necessarily mean that a cause-effect relationship 
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exists between the variables. (Sharma 2005, 1-5.)  The Pearson’s Correlations 
Coefficient is determined using the formula: 
𝑟𝑥𝑦 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦)
𝑆𝑥𝑆𝑦
=
∑(𝑋𝑡 − 𝑋)(𝑌𝑇−)/(𝑛 − 1)
𝑆𝑥𝑆𝑦
 
Once the dependent and independent variables were identified the regression analysis 
was carried out. The regression model chosen to test the hypotheses presented in 
section 2.5 is the ordinary least square (OLS) multivariate regression, which measures 
how two or more independent variables affect changes in the dependent variable. 
Regression analysis is therefore, concerned with causal and functional relationships 
existing between the variables. (Kothari 2004, 130.) This analysis technique involves 
estimating the coefficients of the explanatory (independent) variables that will predict 
the dependent variable (Adams et al. 2014, 202). 
The R square, also known as the coefficient of determination, is also included in the 
research output, serving as another measure for verifying the results of the analysis. 
The value of the coefficient is marked as a percentage, meaning that if for example the 
R square values at 90 percent, it would indicate that 90 percent of the variation in the 
dependent variable is explained by the model. (ibid., 204.) The formula for R Square 
is the following: 
𝑅2 =
𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 (𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛)
=
∑(?̂?𝑡 − ?̅?)
2
∑(𝑦𝑡 − ?̅?)2
 
The OLS Regression equation used for the analysis is the following: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑝
𝑘=1
 
Where: 
𝑦𝑖 − dependent variable of firm i in period t 
𝛼𝑖𝑡 −intercept of the model 
𝑥𝑖 − corresponds to the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ explanatory variable of the model 
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𝜀 − the random error with expectation 0 and variance 𝜎2 
i – each sample firm 
t– each time period of analysis 
Using a multivariate OLS regression analysis the functional relationships of models 
have been measured as follows: 
𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3(𝐿𝑁𝐵𝑉𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐿𝑁𝐵𝑉𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝐷𝐸1)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6(𝐷𝐸2)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8(𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9(𝐸𝑃𝑆)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10(𝐿𝑁𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11(𝑇𝑄)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽13(𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14(𝐿𝑁𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑃𝑎𝑦1𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3(𝐿𝑁𝐵𝑉𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐿𝑁𝐵𝑉𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝐷𝐸1)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6(𝐷𝐸2)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8(𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9(𝐸𝑃𝑆)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10(𝐿𝑁𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11(𝑇𝑄)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽13(𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14(𝐿𝑁𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑃𝑎𝑦2𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3(𝐿𝑁𝐵𝑉𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐿𝑁𝐵𝑉𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝐷𝐸1)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6(𝐷𝐸2)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8(𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9(𝐸𝑃𝑆)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10(𝐿𝑁𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11(𝑇𝑄)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽13(𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14(𝐿𝑁𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 
𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑃𝑎𝑦)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑃𝑎𝑦1)𝑖𝑡
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𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + +𝛽1(𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑃𝑎𝑦)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑃𝑎𝑦1)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑃𝑎𝑦2)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5(𝐿𝑁𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑖𝑡𝛽7(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8(𝐿𝑁𝐵𝑉𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10(𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11(𝐸𝑃𝑆)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12(𝐿𝑁𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽14(𝐿𝑁𝐵𝑉𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15(𝐿𝑁𝐵𝑉𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖𝑡𝛽16(𝐷𝐸1)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17(𝐷𝐸2)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖 
The output of the OLS regression model presents several statistical results allowing 
the most significant variables to be uncovered which would serve best in proving the 
hypotheses. The statistical coefficients drawn from the OLS regression output that 
were considered purposeful for the research included the unstandardized coefficient 
beta, the p-value indicating significance level, and t-value. The maximum level of 
significance considered for the regression coefficients was chosen to be 10% in this 
study. 
The entire analysis implemented in this study, including the correlation- and 
regression analyses were done using the SPSS Statistics software.  
3.3 Validity and Reliability 
The purpose of research is to produce information that is as truthful and reliable as 
possible. All researches want to deliver trustworthy results and prove that the 
measurements and tools they have used are credible. In order to reduce the chances of 
producing flawed results in research it is important to pay attention to the reliability 
and validity of the research design (Saunders et al. 2009, 156). 
Reliability is concerned with the consistency and certainty of the measurement, 
referring to the repeatability of the methods. If the same results can be achieved under 
the same circumstances using the same methods, the measurement can be considered 
reliable. (Krishaswami & Satyaprasad 2010, 93.) According to Saunders et al. (2009), 
threats to reliability include subject error, relating to the issue of external factors (e.g. 
time of the week or day) that may affect the observation; subject bias, e.g. in 
interviews employees might answer what they think their manager wants them to; 
observer error, relating to the way of collecting data (e.g. differing questions in 
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interviews depending on interviewer); and observer bias which is about how the data 
and results and interpreted by the researcher (156-157). 
When examining the level of validity, the researcher needs to ask questions like; are 
the results of the study true, and can the results be generalized to other settings, 
populations, or periods? The first question relates to internal and the latter to external 
validity. There are various threats that researchers need to watch out for when 
conducting studies. (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2002, 55.)  Four common threats include 
History, representing particular events occurring simultaneously with the study that 
can affect the response; maturation, referring to the question of whether the result is 
due to the tested factors or simply the passing of time; test affect, meaning the effect 
of the test itself on observed results; and selection bias referring to circumstances 
where the subjects are not assigned randomly. (ibid., 55-56).  
The author believes that a possible threat to the study is selection bias since the 
subjects or units were not assigned randomly but handpicked from the largest firms, 
therefore, weakening how well the sample represents the whole population (the 
manufacturing industry). Due to availability issues of newer statements (from 2016 to 
2018) at the time of the data collection, the author chose to use older statements to 
avoid having gaps in the data sample. Therefore, the author notes that a risk exists of 
the findings being outdated at the time of publication. Additionally, other issues on 
validity in this particular study includes the time frame used for the data collection. 
For external reasons the length of the research process was prolonged which has 
resulted in a data set that has matured by approx. 4 years.  
Regarding reliability issues, the author notes that due to the lag between data 
collection on results analysis previously unseen errors in data were found that needed 
corrections. Furthermore, this sheds doubt that there might be other errors that have 
gone unnoticed, leaving the reliability of the data somewhat uncertain. Reliability 
issues also exist regarding the figures used to measure CEO performance-based 
compensation. The reason for this is that companies often use different terms for their 
performance-based incentives in their annual reporting (in this case variable pay, 
variable bonus/remuneration, cash bonus, and short-term incentives), which can lead 
to measurement errors in the study resulting from inaccurate or false figures used in 
calculations.  
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4 Results 
The results of the analyses are presented and interpreted in the following chapter. The 
findings will be shown in three subchapters. The first section presents the results of 
the descriptive statistics, familiarizing the reader with the data and variables used. The 
second subchapter goes into the correlation analysis results, illustrating the 
relationships between variables. The second chapter focuses on the primary results, 
the regression analysis findings assessing the truthfulness of the hypotheses.  
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the analysis are presented in table 
2. The table illustrates the minimum and maximum as well as the range between the 
variable values for the period. The mean and standard deviation of the values are also 
shown in the table. The absolute values of the company variables are presented in 
millions (EUR). It is noted that unlike the natural logarithmic values used in 
correlation and regression analyses the absolute values for performance pay utilized in 
the descriptive statistics are not sufficiently comparable. This is because in some cases 
where the information on CEO pay was not fully available, the values of the whole 
executive board for performance pay have been used instead. 
Looking at accounting variables, the table shows that in the sample companies the 
mean for net profit was 716 million, and 1,078 billion for operating profit. The 
maximum was 7,879 billion for net profit and 10,065 billion for operating profit. The 
minimum values of -3789 for net profit and -1318 for operating profit explain the low 
average for values. The standard deviation was very high for both values meaning that 
both values are greatly dispersed from their means and show that the performance 
based on profit was highly varied across the sample companies. The mean of 
operating profit rate is 0.0827 indicating that for every euro of sales the companies 
generated 0.0827 euros of profit (before interest and tax) on average. Meanwhile the 
maximum operating profit rate of 0.46 belonging to Novo Nordisk A/S showed that 
they generated 0.46 euros of profit before interest and tax for every euro of sales. The 
minimum was -0.6304 indicating that for every sales euro Aker ASA their operating 
loss was 0.604 euros. The standard deviation for operating profit rate was a fairly low 
0.118 indicating that the low average performance can be applied to most of the 
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sample companies. The maximum value for both ROA and ROCE is a rather low 0.38 
indicating that the best return demonstrated by the companies was 0.38 euros for every 
1 euro of assets owned or capital employed. The mean for ROA is 0.0563 and 0.0746 
for ROCE both of which are very low and judging by the low standard deviation of 
0.08 and 0.103 apply for almost all of the sample companies. EPS on the other hand 
demonstrated a mean of 1.163, maximum of 5.97, and a minimum of -4.76 with a 
standard deviation of 1.687 indicating that the companies show high variance on the 
earnings per share they generated during the period. On average exhibiting a low 
1.163 earnings but with the high standard deviation indicates it is not conclusive to the 
whole sample. Overall, the accounting performance of the companies was 
comparatively low on average, with very high variability between top and bottom 
performers.  
The market and hybrid performance showed a more positive tendency than the 
accounting measures. The means were 14088 for Market cap, 1.829 for Tobin’s Q, 
0.3009 for stock return, and 0.3162 for Beta. Nevertheless, the high standard 
deviations show that the values are relatively dispersed also in the market variables 
not allowing for assumptions to be made of the whole sample. The mean for market 
cap of 14,08 billion indicates that on average the sample companies would be 
categorized as large-cap. The maximum market value of 129,314 billion belonged to 
Novo Nordisk A/S while AstraZeneca AB had the smallest capitalization of 956,31 
million. Although the wide range of 128,358 billion indicates that the sample 
companies are dispersed among all market capitalizations. The average Tobin’s Q of 
1.829 demonstrates that the sample companies tend to be overvalued, with the 
maximum value a considerable 16.23 indicating that the stock value of Aker ASA is 
16 times more than the cost to replace the company’s assets. The systematic risk 
measured by beta showed that the average risk the companies experience is a quite 
low 0.316 meaning the companies are much less volatile than the market. With a 
standard deviation of 0.420 the results can be applied to the majority of the sample.  
Looking at the governance variables it can be seen that the average size of the board 
of directors in the Nordic manufacturing sector tends to be approximately 10 
members. The maximum for board size was 15, with the largest boards belonging to 
Volvo AB, Atlas Copco AB, and Carlsberg A/S varying in size from 13 to 15 over the 
5–year period. The smallest boards had 7 directors, with Outokumpu Oyj, Neste Oyj, 
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and Yara International having the smallest boards of the sample companies varying 
from 7 to 8 members total. The mean for board independence was found to be 0,847 
indicating that the boards of directors of the sample companies were predominantly 
independent. Stora Enso Oyj, Neste Oyj, and Norsk Hydro ASA had the highest ratios 
(1) with a wholly independent board. The lowest ratio was 0,33 indicating that less 
than half of the board consisted of independent directors. From the sample companies, 
Novo Nordisk A/S, Vestas Wind Systems A/S, and Yara International had the lowest 
board independence. The standard deviations were comparatively low meaning that it 
is safe to conclude that on average nearly all companies had fairly independent and 
moderately sized boards of directors.  
For the performance pay measures ratio 1 measuring the amount of performance-pay 
relative to total compensation displayed a mean of 0.3005 indicating that on average 
the CEOs of the sample companies received a cash bonus that was approximately 30% 
of the total pay. The maximum measured at 0.66, which shows that the highest ratio of 
performance pay was 66% of CEO total compensation. Illustrated by ratio 2, the mean 
for performance pay relative to fixed pay was 0.5247 presenting that on average the 
performance pay was over 50% of the fixed element of CEO compensation. The 
standard deviation for ratio 2 is fairly high, making the values dispersed. In conclusion 
the Nordic companies in the manufacturing sector demonstrate reasonable levels of 
performance-based compensation.  
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
NetProfit* 11668 -3789 7879 716 1261 
OperProf* 11383 -1318 10065 1078 1482 
OperProfRate 1.09 -0.6304 0.46 0.0827 0.118 
MargProd 14.00 -2.6281 11.37 1.1258 1.537 
BVAssets* 52857 4555 57412 14224 11238 
BVDebt* 16219 30 16249 3204 3371 
BVEquity* 17312 1524 18836 5848 4352 
DE1 2.20 0.0051 2.20 0.5936 0.430 
DE2 11.88 0.0004 11.88 0.7823 1.724 
ROA 0.52 -0.1381 0.38 0.0563 0.080 
ROCE 0.67 -0.2855 0.38 0.0746 0.103 
EPS* 10.73 -4.7600 5.97 1.1630 1.687 
MarkerCap* 128358 956 129314 14088 19579 
TQ 16.23 0.1805 16.41 1.8290 2.536 
StockRet 13.029 -0.7374 12.292 0.3009 1.190 
Beta 1.83 -0.3741 1.46 0.3162 0.403 
PerfPay* 2840118 0 2840118 584635 576219 
RatioPerfPay1 0.66 0 0.66 0.3005 0.168 
RatioPerfPay2 1.92 0 1.92 0.5247 0.420 
BoardSize 8 7 15 10 1,934 
RatioBoardInd 0.67 0.33 1 0.847 0.16362 
* the absolute values of the variables of Swedish, Danish and Norwegian companies in the sample are deflated by 
the year-ending exchange rate of Euro against Swedish, Danish and Norwegian crowns, and U.S dollar 
respectively. Number of observations: 125 
 
4.2 Correlation results 
Table 3 presents the correlation results of all the variables used in the study. The table 
lists the dependent variables, consisting of accounting-, market performance, and 
hybrid measures; independent variables, including performance pay- and board 
characteristic variables; and control variables, containing measures of Debt-to-Equity, 
Book value of Assets and Book value of Equity. Correlations with the significance 
levels of 0.01%. 0.05% and 0.1% were considered.  
All three of the performance pay variables (Performance Pay (LN), Ratio of 
Performance Pay 1 and Ratio of Performance Pay 2), were found to have a significant 
(p<0.01) weakly positive correlation with NetProfit, OperProf, and ROCE indicating 
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that as company profitability increases, so does the amount of performance-based pay 
or reversely, that when performance pay increases, it would have a positive impact on 
the company profits. In the case that CEO pay is tied to performance the latter 
relationship would be a natural result as the more profit the company produces, the 
more performance pay the CEO would be given. The correlation with ROCE was 
significantly moderately positive with Ratios 1 and 2, which was stronger than with 
PerfPay (LN). This shows that the more the portion of performance- pay is relative to 
fixed pay or the total compensation of the CEO, the more profit the company 
generates from its total capital. Conversely it can also imply that companies that are 
more efficient with using their capital also tie the CEO pay more tightly to the 
company performance by having a larger portion of the compensation in the form of 
performance-pay. All the performance-pay variables also had a significant (p<0.01) 
weakly positive correlation with ROA, implying that either the better the company 
makes use of its assets, the more the CEO would be paid performance pay, or that 
CEOs who receive more of their pay in the form of performance-based incentive make 
use of the company assets more efficiently. Ratios 1 and 2 also showed a significant 
(p<0.01) weakly positive relationship with operating profit rate indicating the more 
the revenue the company has available to cover non-operating costs, the more 
performance-pay the CEO receives, or oppositely that companies that focus more on 
linking the CEO with the firm’s performance are more effective at generating revenue.  
PerfPay (LN) was positively correlated at the 0.10 level of significance with 
MarketCap (LN), indicating that either larger companies pay more performance pay to 
their chief executives, or CEOs that are paid more performance-based incentives are 
more efficient in growing the market value of the company. 
Both performance pay ratios had a significant (p<0.01) weakly negative correlation 
with D/E 1 (book value of equity), but a significant positive correlation with D/E 2 
(market value of equity). The negative correlation between both ratios and D/E 1 
indicates that the higher the performance pay, the lower the amount of debt compared 
to equity(book value)  the company uses to finance its operations, or that companies 
that borrow less are also more likely to pay their CEOs more performance pay. 
Contrarily, having a positive correlation with D/E 2 would imply that CEOs receiving 
more performance pay relative to fixed and total pay compensation, borrow more to 
finance operations. On the other hand, it can mean that companies with more debt-
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heavy financing relative to their market value rely more on performance-based 
elements of compensation for incentivizing CEO behaviour.  
RatioBoardInd had significant (p<0.01) negative correlations with OperProf (LN), 
ROA, MarketCap (LN), MargProd, TQ, BVAssets (LN) and BVEquity (LN), and a 
positive correlation with D/E 1, but no significant relationship with any of the 
performance pay variables. 
Board size had a significant (p<0.01) weakly positive relationship with BVEquity, 
BVDebt, and MarketCap as well as a moderately positive one with BVAssets. Either 
way this would imply that smaller boards are more effective in managing the company 
to generate more returns on its stock. However, as board size did not have significant 
correlations with any of the other profitability measures, this particular finding is not 
very strong. A positive relationship with MarketCap could indicate that larger 
companies tend to have larger boards, or that larger boards are more effective in 
growing the market value of the company. 
No significant correlation was found between the Board variables (LNBoardSize and 
RatioBoardInd) and Performance Pay variables, which goes against the agency theory 
view that a smaller more independent board would promote compensation practices 
that tie the CEO pay more closely to the company performance, therefore, acting as a 
moderator of the CEOs power over their own pay. 
Most of accounting performance measures showed significant positive correlations 
with performance pay variables, indicating that CEO compensation for performance 
pay would be sensitive to the company’s accounting performance. From market 
performance measures only market cap exhibited a significant (p<0.1) positive 
relationship, which would be in line with the findings of some previous studies that 
showed CEO compensation to be highly sensitive to company size. The hybrid 
measure Tobin’s Q showed no correlation the performance pay measures, but had a 
negative association with board independence implying that a company that has a 
more independent board tends to be undervalued or conversely, that overvalued 
companies would have a lower share of independent directors on the board.  
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Table 3 Pairwise correlation results 
  X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 
X1 1 .831*** .620*** .652*** .587*** .535*** 0.085 .457*** 0.01 .229** 0.006 .439*** .463*** .205** -.219** -0.002 0.16* -0.121 .295*** .296*** .270*** 
X2 .831*** 1 .685*** .582*** .507*** .403*** 0.071 .491*** -0.048 0.068 -0.022 .497*** .510*** .239*** -.201** -0.019 .214** -0.137 .341*** .307*** .257*** 
X3 .620*** .685*** 1 .782*** .510*** .433*** -0.021 .201** -0.023 0.145* -0.01 0.145* .191** -0.174 -.375*** 0.101 .181** -.383*** 0.12 .291*** .288*** 
X4 .652*** .582*** .782*** 1 .658*** .502*** -0.013 .375*** 0.009 .226** .376*** 0.068 0.144 -.320*** -.494*** -0.076 0.127 -.387*** .237*** .373*** .333*** 
X5 .587*** .507*** .510*** .658*** 1 .563*** -0.003 0.099 0.01 0.086 0.114 -0.113 -0.07 -.285*** -.432*** -0.026 0.039 0.058 .222** .477*** .459*** 
X6 .535*** .403*** .433*** .502*** .563*** 1 -0.038 0.114 0.034 0.123 .218** -0.039 0.04 -0.153* -.385*** 0.061 0.087 -0.152* .186** .261*** .212** 
X7 0.085 0.071 -0.021 -0.013 -0.003 -0.038 1 0.004 -0.05 -0.004 -0.057 0.135 0.146* 0.082 -0.08 0.014 0.075 0.039 0.043 -0.059 -0.062 
X8 .457*** .491*** .201** .375*** 0.099 0.114 0.004 1 0.026 0.149* .370*** .663*** .666*** .425*** 0.032 -.460*** .346*** -.254*** 0.158* -0.07 -0.139 
X9 0.01 -0.048 -0.023 0.009 0.01 0.034 -0.05 0.026 1 -0.002 -0.081 0.001 0.005 0.064 0.063 -0.115 0.1 -0.079 0.035 -0.102 -0.129 
X10 .229** 0.068 0.145 .226** 0.086 0.123 -0.004 0.149* -0.002 1 0.092 0.096 0.106 0.007 -0.065 -0.026 0.049 -.177** 0.044 0.132 0.114 
X11 0.006 -0.022 -0.01 .376*** 0.114 .218** -0.057 .370*** -0.081 0.092 1 -.207** -0.175* -.361*** -.211** -.228** 0.145* -.268*** 0.082 0.131 0.069 
Y1 .439*** .497*** 0.145* 0.068 -0.113 -0.039 0.135 .663*** 0.001 0.096 -.207** 1 .974*** .839*** .182** 0.083 .404*** -.216** 0.16* -0.06 -0.049 
Y2 .463*** .510*** .191** 0.144 -0.07 0.04 0.146* .666*** 0.005 0.106 -0.175* .974*** 1 .776*** 0.011 0.059 .351*** -.242*** 0.171* -0.046 -0.044 
Y3 .205** .239*** -0.174* -.320*** -.285*** -0.153* 0.082 .425*** 0.064 0.007 -.361*** .839*** .776*** 1 .532*** 0.15* .259*** 0.065 0.034 -.197** -0.17* 
Y4 -.219** -.201** -.375*** -.494*** -.432*** -.385*** -0.08 0.032 0.063 -0.065 -.211** .182** 0.011 .532*** 1 0.089 0.036 .289*** -0.084 -.281** -.251*** 
Y5 -0.002 -0.019 0.101 -0.076 -0.026 0.061 0.014 -.460*** -0.115 -0.026 -.228** 0.083 0.059 0.15* 0.089 1 0.136 -0.014 0.025 .292*** .436*** 
Y6 0.16* .214** .181** 0.127 0.039 0.087 0.075 .346*** 0.1 0.049 0.145* .404*** .351*** .259*** 0.036 0.136 1 -.359*** -0.121 -0.007 0.028 
Y7 -0.121 -0.137 -.383*** -.387*** 0.058 -0.152* 0.039 -.254*** -0.079 -.177** -.268*** -.216** -.242*** 0.065 .289*** -0.014 -.359*** 1 0.111 0.024 0.028 
Y8 .295*** .341*** 0.12 .237*** .222** .186** 0.043 0.158* 0.035 0.044 0.082 0.16* 0.171* 0.034 -0.084 0.025 -0.121 0.111 1 .585*** .435*** 
Y9 .296*** .307*** .291*** .373*** .477*** .261*** -0.059 -0.07 -0.102 0.132 0.131 -0.06 -0.046 -.197** -.281*** .292*** -0.007 0.024 .585*** 1 .948*** 
Y10 .270*** .257*** .288*** .333*** .459*** .212** -0.062 -0.139 -0.129 0.114 0.069 -0.049 -0.044 -0.17* -.251*** .436*** 0.028 0.028 .435*** .948*** 1 
Note: *** p<0,01; ** p<0,05; *p<0,1 
X1: LNNetProfit; X2: LNOperProf; X3: OperProfRate; X4: ROA; X5: ROCE; X6: EPS; X7: StockRet; X8: LNMarketCap; X9: Beta; X10: MargProd; X11: TQ; 
Y1: LNBVAssets, Y2: LNBVEquity, Y3: LNBVDebt, Y4: DE1, Y5: DE2, Y6: LNBoardSize, Y7: RatioBoardInd, Y8: LNPerfPay, Y9: RatioPerfPay1, Y10: RatioPerfPay2 
Number of observations: 125 
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4.3 Multivariate OLS Regression analysis results 
Tables 4, 5, and 6 illustrate the dependence of firstly, the performance pay variables 
on the governance variables, and secondly, the accounting-, market- and hybrid 
performance variables on the performance pay variables. The dependency on control 
variables including BV Assets (LN), BV Equity (LN), BV Debt (LN), DE1, and DE2 
are also presented in each table respectively. Additionally, when examining 
accounting performance variables, market performance variables were also used as 
independent variables in the analysis and vice versa. The level of significance is 
expressed with * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. The results in the tables are 
presented with two figures: the estimated coefficient B on top, and the t value under in 
parenthesis to indicate the level of significance.  
As shown in Table 4, from the performance pay variables only performance pay (LN) 
showed a significant dependence board size (p-value=0.019) and board independence 
(p-value=0.064). The relationship with board size was negative, indicating that as 
board the board size grows, the total amount of performance pay decreases. This 
clearly suggests that smaller boards pay the more performance-based pay, therefore, 
more effectively tie CEOs compensation to company performance. With the ratio of 
board independence, the association was positive, implying that companies with more 
independent boards pay more performance-based incentives to their CEOs. Hence, it 
can be suggested that higher board independence leads to better incentive alignment. 
Based on these findings it can be concluded that, board size and independence have an 
impact on CEO performance pay therefore, proving hypothesis H1a and H1b. 
Although the current study does not focus on examining the dependencies from this 
angle, it is still noted that the performance pay variables presented significant 
dependencies also on accounting-, market, and control variables. Performance pay 
(LN) was positively dependent on Operating profit (LN) at the 0.0.5 level of 
significance, suggesting that higher profitability would lead to higher performance 
pay. This can be due to companies being able to pay more when they are producing 
more profits, or simply because performance pay is an effect of good performance, the 
CEO is rewarded for his or her efficiency. Both ratio 1 and ratio 2 of performance pay 
were significantly positively dependent on ROCE at the 0.01 level, indicating that 
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companies deploying their capital more effectively also pay their CEOs more 
performance-based pay relative to total compensation. Ratio 2 also showed a 
significant negative dependency on market cap, while ratio 1 demonstrated a positive 
association, both at the 0.05 level. The positive association of ratio 1 with market cap 
suggests that the proportion of performance pay to total compensation increases as the 
firm size grows, while the negative relationship of ratio 2 would imply that smaller 
companies pay a more performance pay relative to fixed pay.  
Performance pay (LN) and ratio 2 displayed positive dependency on Beta at the 0.10 
level of significance, suggesting when a company is exposed to higher risk, the level 
of CEO performance pay also increases. This suggests that in companies that are 
exposed to more volatility in the market, the CEOs are compensated more in the form 
of performance incentives perhaps to account for risk-bearing.  
The R square for PerfPay (LN) was 0.307 indicating that changes in performance pay 
can be explained by the independent variables in the model, but not completely. Ratio 
1 had an R square of 0.434, and for ratio 2 it was 0.509, which indicates that the 
chosen independent variables explain the changes in the ratios fairly well, but not 
perfectly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   50 
 
Table 4 Performance-Pay Variables 
Dependent variables LNPerfPay RatioPerfPay1 RatioPerfPay2 
(Constant) 5.367 
-0.8 
0.165 
-0.65 
0.078 
-0.132 
LNBoardSize -5.702** 
(-2.472) 
-0.106 
(-1.211) 
-0.223 
(-1.099) 
RatioBoardInd 5.727* 
(1.875 
0.142 
(1.23) 
0.333 
(1.237) 
LNNetProf -0.242 
(-0.191) 
-0.008 
(-0.89) 
-0.007 
(-0.338) 
LNOperProf 0.653** 
(2.552) 
0.018* 
(1.81) 
0.02 
(0.895) 
OperProfRate -11.831 
(-1.692) 
-0.222 
(-0.84) 
-0.3 
(-0.488) 
MargProd 0.103 
(0.45) 
0.014 
(1.598) 
0.028 
(1.379) 
LNBVAssets 3,.77 
(1.553) 
0.15* 
(1.72) 
0.377* 
(1.859) 
LNBVEquity -0.572 
(-0.243 
-0.134 
(-1.503) 
-0.368* 
(-1.776) 
LNBVDebt -1.617* 
(-1.913) 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
-0.001 
(-0.009) 
DE1 1.366 
(0.602) 
-0.16 
(-1.465) 
-0.359* 
(-1.799) 
DE2 0.105 
(0.285) 
0.033*** 
(4.46) 
0.109*** 
(6.417) 
ROA 10.611 
(0.783) 
0.427 
(0.833) 
0.694 
(0.582) 
ROCE 0.508 
(0.077) 
0.758*** 
(6.269) 
1.907*** 
(6.735) 
EPS 0.406 
(1.361) 
-0.007 
(-0.582) 
-0.037 
(-1.408) 
LNMarketCap -0.714 
(-0.983) 
0.120** 
(2.319) 
-0.186** 
(-2,348) 
TQ 0.304 
(1.068) 
0.01** 
(2.022) 
0.126* 
(1.762) 
StockRet -9.94E-06 
(-0.061) 
-6.59E-06 
(-1.075) 
-1.67E-05 
(-1.17) 
Beta 1.494* 
(1.713) 
0.005 
(0.144) 
-0.134* 
(-1.679) 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.  
Number of observations: 125 
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Nearly all of the accounting performance variables presented in Table 5 showed 
significant positive dependency on the performance pay variables, except for Marginal 
productivity. Statistically significant dependency at the 0.01 level was found for Net 
profit, Operating profit, ROA, and ROCE. Operating profit rate was significantly 
positively dependent on ratio 2 at the 0.01 level (p-value= 0.004), and at the 0.05 level 
of significance on ratio 1 (p-value= 0.046), as well as on performance pay (LN) (p-
value= 0.05). The positive association with operating profit rate implies that higher 
performance pay is linked to increased returns on sales, making the company better 
equipped to cover non-operating expenses such as interest, which also makes it more 
attractive to investors and lenders. Both ROA and ROCE were significantly positively 
associated with all performance pay measures at the 0.01 level, presenting that CEOs 
that receive more performance pay are more effective with turning the company assets 
as well as shareholders’ equity and debt into earnings. Both ROA and ROCE are 
common profitability measures used by investors to determine useful investment 
opportunities, making it reasonable for executives to work to improve those metrics in 
company performance. EPS also showed positive dependency on PerfPay (LN) at the 
0.05 level, illustrating that share value increases with CEO performance pay. Properly 
incentivized CEOs can be more motivated and operate more efficiently, which can in 
turn raise the trust of investors in the company profitability. These results would 
indicate that rewarding the CEO with higher levels of performance pay on its own as 
well as relative to fixed- and total compensation leads to increased firm profitability 
on several accounting performance measures. 
The R squares for the accounting performance variables were 0.451 for NetProfit, 
0.512 for OperProf, 0.528 for OperProfRate, 0.653 for ROA, 0.466 for ROCE, and 
0.314 for EPS. With the majority of the dependent variables, with R squares ranging 
from 0.451 to 0.653, the models explain approximately half of the variability in the 
dependent variable, making the model a reasonably good fit. For EPS the R square of 
0.314 indicates that only 31,4% of the variability is caused by the independent 
variables, which is statistically high enough, but shows that other factors play a role in 
explaining earnings per share that were not included in this analysis.  
Additionally, significant positive dependency on board independence was found at the 
<0.05 level for ROA and ROCE, as well as a significant negative association with 
operating profit rate at the 0.01 level, indicating that companies with a higher ratio of 
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independence produce better returns on their assets and capital but less return on sales 
revenue. However, none of the accounting variables were significantly dependent on 
board size implying that the size of the board does not directly correlate with firm 
accounting performance.  
In conclusion, these results show that a significant positive relationship exists between 
accounting-based performance measures and CEO performance pay proving 
hypothesis H2a that higher performance-based pay leads to higher accounting 
performance. 
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Table 5 Accounting measures 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.  
Number of observations: 125 
 
Table 6 shows that from the market performance measures, market cap was 
significantly positively dependent on ratio 1 (p-value= 0.022) and ratio 2 (p-value= 
0.013) at the 0.05 level. This finding shows that higher performance-based pay leads 
to better market value for the company. Proper incentives can motivate CEOs to make 
decisions that increase shareholder wealth which can result in a positive reaction from 
Dependent 
variables 
LNNetProfit LNOperProf OperProfRate MargProd ROA ROCE EPS 
(Constant) -5.905 
(-1.404) 
-8.857 
(-2.305) 
0.089 
(0.613) 
2.042 
(0.757) 
0.011 
(0.134) 
-0.025 
(-0.304) 
2.434 
(0.991) 
LNPerfPay 0.233*** 
(2.811) 
0.159*** 
(2.765) 
0.165** 
(1.983) 
0.009 
(0.234) 
0.002* 
(1.65) 
0.004** 
(2.015) 
0.082** 
(2.226) 
RatioPerfPay1 6.19*** 
(4.498) 
4.2*** 
(2.858) 
0.111** 
(2.014) 
1.267 
(1.302) 
0.101*** 
(3.228) 
0.113*** 
(2.081) 
0.018 
(0.004) 
RatioPerfPay2 2.415*** 
(4.367) 
2.331*** 
(4.523) 
0.299*** 
(3.76) 
0.497 
(1.187) 
0.041*** 
(2.961) 
0.079*** 
(3.627) 
-1.055 
(-0,482) 
LNBoardSize -1.695 
(-1.084) 
-0.477 
(-0.334) 
0.021 
(0.397) 
-0.152 
(-0.301) 
-0.024 
(-0.757) 
0.012 
(2.47) 
0.787 
(0.862) 
RatioBoardInd 0.922 
(0.517) 
0.744 
(0.457) 
-0.185*** 
(-2.997) 
-0.137 
(-0.61) 
-0.069** 
(-2.006) 
0.114** 
(2.235) 
-1.047 
(-1.005) 
LNMarketCap 1.961*** 
(4.62) 
1.696*** 
(4.375) 
0.079*** 
(5.36) 
0.32 
(0.993) 
0.051*** 
(9.646) 
0.077*** 
(6.294) 
0.821*** 
(3.314) 
StockRet 9.58E-05 
(0.872) 
4.13E-05 
(0.411) 
7.86E-07 
(0.207) 
-0.049 
(-0.43) 
1.07E-06 
(0.484) 
1.37E-06 
(0.385) 
-8.23E-07 
(-0.013) 
Beta 0.403 
(0.682) 
-0.95 
(-0.361) 
-0.005 
(-0.222) 
-1.87E-05 
(-0.226) 
0.012 
(0.961) 
0.016 
(0.835) 
0.113 
(0.328) 
TQ -0.455*** 
(-2.927) 
-0.469*** 
(-3.305) 
-0.032*** 
(-6.005) 
0.05 
(0.133) 
-0.008** 
(-2.402) 
-0.018*** 
(-3.528) 
-0.105 
(-1.155) 
LNBVAssets 1.887 
(1.363) 
2.505*** 
(1.981) 
0.599** 
(2.608) 
-0.274 
(-0.314) 
0.692*** 
(3.969) 
0.06 
(1.342) 
-1.703** 
(-2.108) 
LNBVEquity 1.229*** 
(3.463) 
-2.718** 
(2.255) 
0.609** 
(2.507) 
0.333 
(0.416) 
0.802*** 
(4.265) 
-0.144*** 
(-3.372) 
0.235 
(0.305) 
LNBVDebt -0.386*** 
(-3.138) 
-0.976*** 
(-3.984) 
-0.054*** 
(-0.506) 
-0.21 
(-0.784) 
-0.04*** 
(-7.364) 
0.015 
(1.019) 
0.574** 
(2.199) 
DE1 -3.683*** 
(-3.006) 
-3.429*** 
(-3.064) 
-0.287*** 
(-3.423) 
0.248 
(0.328) 
-0.033** 
(-2.477) 
-0.215*** 
(-5.429) 
-1.93*** 
(-2.698) 
DE2 0.8*** 
(3.672) 
0.6*** 
(3.014) 
0.038*** 
(6.596) 
0.129 
(0.819) 
0.023*** 
(6.507) 
0.031*** 
(4.387) 
0.428*** 
(3.362) 
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the market. Additionally, the results showed that market cap was significantly 
positively dependent (p-value 0.00) on board size and negatively correlated with board 
independence (p-value= 0.059), indicating that larger companies tend to also have 
larger, less independent boards. The reason for such an association could be explained 
by the view that larger boards have more resources to manage the company 
effectively. Additionally, the negative relationship with board independence can 
suggest that inside directors have a better understanding of the company, and 
therefore, they would be more efficient in generating profits out of its activities. Stock 
return on the other hand had no significant relationship with any of the independent 
variables, while Beta demonstrated a positive association with PerfPay (LN) and 
BoardSize (LN), as well as a negative one with D/E 2 at the 0.10 level of significance. 
These findings suggest that companies that have larger boards and pay their CEOs 
more performance pay are more sensitive to market fluctuations. Tying executive pay 
more tightly to the company performance can provoke the CEO to take riskier actions 
in hopes of improving profitability. The negative association with D/E 2 indicates that 
in companies where debt exceeds the market value of the company’s equity, the risk is 
also increased.  
The hybrid measure Tobin’s Q was significantly positively associated with 
performance pay (LN) at the 0.05 level and ratio 2 at the 0.1 level, indicating that a 
higher level of performance-based pay leads to a higher market-than-book value of the 
firm. This would indicate that companies, where the CEO pay is more tightly linked to 
company performance, tend to be overvalued. When properly incentivized the CEO is 
more motivated to take actions that can potentially increase shareholder value such as 
specific investments, increasing the positive response from investors in the market. 
Tobin’s Q also demonstrated significant relationships with both governance variables 
showing a positive dependency on board size (p-value= 0.033) and a significantly 
negative (p-value= 0.009) one on board independence. These findings imply that 
larger boards also induce company overvaluation on the market, while higher board 
independence leads to the company being undervalued. Beta had a positive association 
with performance pay (LN) and board size at the 0.1 level. The findings signify that 
companies with larger boards experience more volatility, as well as companies where 
the CEO receives more performance-based pay are also exposed to more risk. The 
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positive dependency on performance pay can result from the CEOs making riskier 
decisions when motivated to increase company performance more. 
The R square for MarketCap (LN) was 0.846 which is extremely high and proves that 
the changes are almost completely explained by the independent variables in the 
model. The R square for Beta was 0.1 and 0.074 for StockRet which are rather low 
and imply that there are other factors affecting these variables that were not examined 
in the current study. Tobin’s Q, however, had an R square of 0.420 proving that 
almost 50% of the changes can be explained by the independent variables.  
Although not all market performance measures showed statistically significant 
dependencies with performance pay measures, there was a significant positive 
relationship between Market cap and Tobin’s Q, and two of the performance pay 
variables. These findings prove hypothesis H2b that higher performance pay leads to 
higher market performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   56 
 
Table 6 Market- & Hybrid* performance measures and risk 
Dependent 
variables 
MarketCapLN StockRet Beta TQ 
(Constant) -0.938 
(-0.761) 
-5067.95 
(-1.277) 
0.475 
-0.652 
2.014 
(0,579) 
LNPerfPay -0.011 
(-0.027) 
4.993 
(0.086) 
0.018* 
(1.656) 
0.137* 
(1.711) 
RatioPerfPay1 0.120** 
(2.319) 
-1447.481 
(-1.124) 
-0.078 
(-0.272) 
2.297 
(1.641) 
RatioPerfPay2 0.138** 
(2.519) 
-624.481 
(-1.133) 
-0.066 
(-0.538) 
0.967* 
(0.109) 
LNBoardSize 1.139*** 
(2.73) 
791.912 
(0.607) 
0.433* 
(1.758) 
2.485** 
(2.157) 
RatioBoardInd -0.097* 
(-1.904) 
-172.983 
(-0.656) 
-0.478 
(-1.428) 
-4.076*** 
(-2.661) 
LNNetProfit 0.172*** 
(3.154) 
0.502 
(0.004) 
0.475 
(0.861) 
-0.011 
(-0.083) 
LNOperProf 0.172*** 
(3.058) 
6.403 
(0.049) 
-0.037 
(-1.291) 
0.228** 
(2.139) 
OperProfRate -3.916*** 
(-3.604) 
-944.719 
(-0.33) 
0.367 
(0.572) 
-12.297*** 
(-4.145) 
MargProd 0.012 
(0.268) 
-20.432 
(-0.175) 
-0.013 
(-0.051) 
0.067 
(0.517) 
ROA 10.204*** 
(4.655) 
42.61 
(0.008) 
0.135 
(0.105) 
 
ROCE 0.137*** 
(2.808) 
1263.68 
(0.434) 
0.357 
(0.511) 
0.505 
(0.171) 
EPS 0.130*** 
(2.641) 
-0.706 
(-0.029) 
-0.017 
(-0.522) 
0.43*** 
(2.787) 
LNBVAssets 0.525** 
(2.404) 
496.822 
(0.36) 
-0.087 
(-0.405) 
 
BVEquityLN 0.735*** 
(14.781) 
-159.575 
(-0.113) 
0.202 
(0.783) 
1.014** 
(2.289) 
LNBVDebt -0.167 
(-1.043) 
-207.747 
(-0.482) 
0.132 
(1.397) 
-1.688*** 
(-4.37) 
DE1 0.991** 
(2.398) 
18.763 
(0.017) 
0.079 
(0.323) 
2.346*** 
(2.687) 
DE2 -0.44*** 
(-11.14) 
71.535 
(0.667) 
-0.045* 
(-0.56) 
-0.213* 
(-1.839) 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
Number of observations: 125 
*Hybrid performance 
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5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this following section is to summarize and explain the findings that 
were presented and analysed in the Results- part of the thesis. This is done in order to 
answer the research questions and emphasize the interrelationship between the results 
and the theoretical findings. Limitations of this study, as well as recommendations for 
future research, will also be discussed at the end of the section. 
5.1 Discussion 
The findings produced by the analyses were able to answer all the research questions 
posed at the beginning of the thesis. Each hypothesis was also supported by the 
results. The effects of CEO performance-based compensation on company financial 
performance, as well as the influence of board structure on performance-pay were 
tested in this study. Using the OLS regression statistics the results adequately 
answered the research questions, which will be summarized next.  
1. Is there any association between the firm-performance and the 
performance-based compensation of CEOs? 
H2a: Higher performance-based pay leads to a higher accounting  performance 
The findings show a clear link between CEO performance-based compensation and 
company accounting performance contrary to many previous studies that have found 
no significant relationship between accounting-based measures and CEO 
compensation. Surprisingly, CEO pay-performance sensitivity was much more 
prominent with the accounting performance measures than it was with market 
measures as a bulk of previous research has shown evidence of the opposite. This can, 
however, be a result of the specific type of performance-pay element used in the 
study, which was purely in the form of cash bonus which is often determined by 
accounting measures. Also, not including other components, such as stock options can 
make the measure slightly less sensitive to market performance.  
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H2b: Higher performance-based pay leads to a higher market performance 
The results showed a significant positive association between performance pay 
measures and market performance of the company, mainly market capitalization. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that performance pay has a positive impact on company 
market performance is proven. Also, beta and Tobin’s Q displayed a positive 
association with the level of performance pay, while stock return demonstrated no 
significant relationships. These findings suggest that in companies where the CEO is 
paid more performance-based incentives, the market value of the company is also 
higher implying that the CEOs would be more efficient in managing the company and 
increasing shareholder value. From another perspective, it can also be that investors 
have more confidence in companies that are more committed to aligning the CEO 
with company profitability, therefore, being willing to invest and pay more for the 
company shares. The link between pay and firm size is also in line with various 
previous studies where CEO compensation was found to be higher in larger 
companies, even though the relationship examined was from the perspective of 
excessive total compensation of executives. Additionally, the positive relationship 
with beta could mean that CEOs take on more risk when appropriately encouraged 
through compensation which would serve as relieving implication on the agency 
theory view of the risk-aversion of managers. However, the significance was not 
statistically high enough to make proper conclusions. 
2. Do board characteristics impact the relative share of performance-based 
pay in the total compensation of CEOs?  
H1a: Board size affects the performance-based pay 
In line with the agency theory view and findings of several previous studies a 
significant relationship was found between board size and the performance pay 
variables. The results of the effect of board structure on performance pay showed that 
board size was negatively associated with the level of performance pay, indicating that 
as board size decreases, CEO performance pay increases. According to the agency 
theory view, corporate governance ‘best practices’ such as a smaller board of 
directors, should show to be more effective in controlling the CEO pay, by for 
example setting such pay arrangements that link the CEO compensation with the 
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performance of the firm. The findings, therefore, support the agency theory view and 
contend with the managerial power theory that argues boards would be ineffective in 
controlling the CEO compensation. 
H1b: A more independent board of directors gives more performance-based pay 
The board independence was found to have a positive impact on performance This is 
in line with the theoretical review that director independence would be a key 
instrument in controlling executive pay. In accordance with the agency theory view, 
the findings indicate that in companies where the boards consist of a larger share of 
independent directors, the CEO performance-based compensation is higher, and is, 
therefore, more directly tied to the performance of the firm. In summary, the results 
imply that independent directors are efficiently working in favour of the shareholders’ 
interests. 
5.2 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
There are various limitations to the conducted research for this thesis, which provide 
suggestions for future studies. The focus of this study was on the manufacturing 
industry as well as publicly listed companies on the OMX Nordic 40 stock index. In 
order to obtain more comprehensive results, future research could be done using a 
wider range of industries as well as examining companies that are privately owned or 
listed on other indices. The performance pay variables used to measure CEO pay-for-
performance sensitivity in the research were also limited to the more traditional 
element of cash bonus, which can be somewhat outdated in the current market 
environment. Taking more of the performance incentive elements (such as stock 
options) into consideration can provide a more comprehensive understanding of the 
effects of the CEO compensation structures in companies to assure the creation of 
shareholder wealth. It is also noted that a large bulk of previous literature has focused 
on the CEO total compensation, finding evidence that in companies with more 
independent boards were negatively correlated with the levels of CEO total pay, and 
not on the performance pay element, which can pose a challenge on comparability on 
previous findings.  
There is also the matter of the reliability of the company annual reports’ data. It 
should be noted that companies may attempt to present only favourable information or 
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even avoid disclosing some data for some particular reason. Such information 
moulding or concealment can cause the data analysis to be faulty and misleading.  
As this study was conducted using solely quantitative methods, for future research the 
author suggests that using qualitative elements such as interviews or questionnaires in 
addition to secondary data collection could provide further insights and support for the 
findings. 
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